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ABSTRACT 
Hyperlinks are critical to communication in part because they facilitate access to 
information.  They provide visitors on one website a way to navigate to internally referenced 
words, phrases, arguments, and ideas.   In addition to being vehicles for communication, this 
article contends that hyperlinks are communicative in and of themselves.  They signal user 
preferences, democratize the national dialogue, indicate credibility, function as a signature on a 
virtual petition and help establish virtual associations.  This Article presents the first 
comprehensive examination of First Amendment concerns related to hyperlinks and argues that 
any judicial or legislative regulation of hyperlinks should be reviewed under a strict scrutiny 
standard. Nearly 50 years ago, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional privilege to 
disseminate information in New York Times v. Sullivan.  In Sullivan, the Court extended a 
constitutional privilege to newspapers because of their role as an incredibly important, unique 
medium of communication.  The same sentiment should extend to protect new media as they 
emerge.  This Article concludes by discussing how a strict scrutiny standard should be applied to 
claims alleging trademark infringement, e-trespass, copyright infringement, contributory 
infringement, and contract violation as a result of hyperlink use.    
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“The ability to refer to a document (or a person or any thing else) is in 
general a fundamental right of free speech to the same extent that speech is 
free.  Making the reference with a hypertext link is more efficient but 
changes nothing else.” 
—Tim Berners-Lee1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is an unprecedented medium of communication.  It 
affords individuals opportunities to speak to, organize among, and 
learn from all those connected to its network.  The ability to speak 
anonymously, to reach millions of people, and to find like-minded 
and not-so-like minded communities cheaply and quickly makes the 
Internet an incredibly valuable tool in proliferating First Amendment 
values.  Communication on the Internet occurs though emails, web-
sites, pop-up ads, banner advertisements, and, increasingly, hyper-
links.  A hyperlink, or a link, is a “cross-reference . . . appearing on 
one [W]eb page that, when activated by the point-and-click of a 
mouse, brings onto the computer screen another [W]eb page.”2  A 
link can appear as a blue, underlined version of an Internet address 
 
 1 Tim Berners-Lee, Links and Law:  Myths, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM (W3C) (Apr. 
1997), http://www.w3.org/DesignIssues/LinkMyths.html.  Tim Berners-Lee is the Direc-
tor of the World Wide Web Consortium. 
 2 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 455 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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(“URL”) or as a word, phrase, or image embedded with the URL of 
the linked website.  Either way, clicking on the link directs the user to 
the linked website. 
Hyperlinks have long been understood to be critical to communi-
cation because they facilitate access to information.  They provide visi-
tors on one website a way to navigate to internally referenced words, 
phrases, arguments, and ideas.  Under this view, if the Internet is an 
endless expanse of information where “any person . . . . can become a 
pamphleteer”3 then “[h]yperlinks are the paths among websites, 
creating the bustling street corners for distribution of those pamph-
lets and inviting passersby to engage more deeply with the issues 
raised.”4 
This notion of hyperlinks as the vehicle of communication is con-
firmed by the rise of services that specialize in making it easier to 
share links.  TwitThis, for example, provides customers with a simple 
widget to add to the bottom of their blog posts.  It encourages blog 
readers to click on the widget and share the URL of that blog post in-
stantly via their Twitter accounts.  As a testament to its utility, another 
link sharing service, AddThis, said recently that its service reaches a 
billion unique users every month.5 
In addition to being vehicles for communication on the Internet, 
this Article contends that hyperlinks should be understood as com-
munication in their own right.  Hyperlinks both explicitly and impli-
citly communicate messages.  For example, if, on my Facebook page, 
I provided a link to www.prochoice.com or www.dailyshow.com, those 
viewing my profile could fairly estimate my political leanings and my 
sense of humor.  If I am the author of a new online newspaper, links 
function as virtual footnotes, communicating credibility to my read-
ers.  In both of these examples, the hyperlink functions as both a me-
chanism of access to, and an independent source of, information.  In 
the former instance, the message is explicit—announcing to your 
network of friends that you like Jon Stewart.  In the latter instance the 
message is implicit—subtly communicating to a newspaper’s readers 
that they can trust their news source. 
 
 3 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
 4 Brief for Openlaw Participants as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants at 3, Universal 
City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 111 F. Supp. 2d 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 00 Civ. 0277), avail-
able at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/amicus.html. 
 5 Justin Thorp, New AddThis Analytics, Now with Audience Interests, ADDTHIS BLOG (Dec. 20, 
2010), http://www.addthis.com/blog/2010/12/20/new-addthis-analytics-now-with-
audience-interests/. 
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These are not the only messages hyperlinks convey, however.  
Hyperlinks communicate a range of both explicit and implicit mes-
sages.  Marshall Kirkpatrick, a long time technology blogger, has writ-
ten about the analytical value of hyperlinks in determining individual 
preferences and social relevance.  In one post about the use of the 
popular URL-shortening service, Bit.ly, he argues that the company 
that best analyzes the linking data sent across the networks of social 
media websites like Twitter and Facebook will be as revolutionary 
Google.  He writes that “[p]ublishing the metrics of sharing on the 
social [W]eb is something that is very fairly compared to indexing the 
pages of the [W]eb and analyzing the links between them.”6 
Kirkpatrick’s belief is substantiated by the rapid growth of compa-
nies interested in aggregating and analyzing individuals’ linking data.  
ShareThis is another one of many companies that allow users to share 
more easily the links to the websites they visit with their friends across 
a number of social media including Facebook, StumbleUpon, MyS-
pace, LinkedIn, and Twitter.  The New York Magazine website employs 
ShareThis to let their online readers quickly and seamlessly share a 
link to an article they liked with their friends and colleagues through 
their social medium of choice.  ShareThis then provides New York 
Magazine with information about their users based on their sharing 
habits.7  This information helps New York Magazine identify user prefe-
rences.  AddThis, mentioned before, also provides user analytics.8 
Twitt(url)y, TweetMeme, and Topsy are all services that aggregate 
and monitor links tweeted by users on Twitter.  Twitt(url)y monitors 
public Tweets and ranks sites based on the number of times their 
URLs are tweeted by users.  TweetMeme is a service that aggregates 
links on Twitter to determine which links are most popular.  Tweet-
Meme then buckets these links into categories, subcategories, and 
channels so that users can easily identify which links are relevant to 
their particular interest.  Topsy is a search engine, much like Google, 
except that instead of indexing the World Wide Web, Topsy indexes 
the tweets of the “30 million or so [Twitter] users” sending out “tens 
of thousands of unique links per day to interesting things around the 
 
 6 Marshall Kirkpatrick, Twitter Crowns Bit.ly as the King of Short Links; Here’s What It Means, 
READ WRITE WEB (May 6, 2009, 11:11 AM), http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/
twitter_crowns_bitly_as_the_king_of_short_links_he.php. 
 7 See Reporting & Analytics, SHARETHIS, http://sharethis.com/publishers/
features_reporting (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
 8 Thorp, supra note 5. 
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Internet.”9  Underpinning the logic behind all three of these sites is a 
belief that links transmitted by individuals are informative of some-
thing much bigger than just the information to which they link. 
As Kirkpatrick described it,  
People share links to pages.  By email, on Facebook, on Twitter and 
through countless other methods [sic].  The company that does the best 
job analyzing that sharing activity and creating a compelling user expe-
rience based on it is likely to become a very big deal. . . . Allong [sic] the 
way the service [Bit.ly] analyzes the page being linked to, pulls out the 
key concepts discussed on that page, and then provides real-time statistics 
about where the link is being shared and how many people are clicking 
on it.10 
Drawing inferences from the way we link is not a new idea.  Every 
modern search engine does it daily.  However, in the early days of 
search, search engines like AltaVista determined their search results 
based on how well a Web page matched the query.11  AltaVista met its 
demise in the late 1990s in the face of Google’s growing popularity 
among Web users.  The key, in part, to Google’s success was its revo-
lutionary belief that the relevance of a given website is determined 
not by the text on that site but rather by how many other websites 
linked to that site.  This belief was hard-coded into the PageRank al-
gorithm,12 the code behind Google’s search engine.  PageRank re-
mains in use today and continues to place heavily linked-to sites to-
wards the top of its search results. 
These anecdotes about companies like Google and Topsy tell an 
important story about how individuals can contribute to the national 
dialogue.  The technologies that underpin Google and Topsy func-
tion in a way that allows every Internet user to contribute in the effort 
to push an obscure idea into national relevance.  For example, 
Google is widely considered to be one of the best traffic generators 
for a given website.  The top results that appear in a Google search 
are awarded an incredible amount of traffic. 
 
 9 Michael Arrington, Topsy Search Launches:  ReTweets Are the New Currency of the Web, 
TECHCRUNCH.COM (May 26, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/05/26/topsy-search-
launches-retweets-are-the-new-currency-of-the-web/. 
 10 Kirkpatrick, supra note 6. 
 11 Arrington, supra note 9 (“Before Google, search engines like AltaVista determined relev-
ance based on how well a [W]eb page matched the query.”). 
 12 The patent describes PageRank as a technology which “assigns importance ranks to nodes 
in a linked database, such as any database of documents containing citations, the [W]orld 
[W]ide [W]eb or any other hypermedia database.”  U.S. Patent No. 6,285,999 (filed Jan. 
9, 1998).  The method involves “identifying a weighting factor for each of the linking 
documents, the weighting factor being dependent on the number of links to the one or 
more linking documents, and adjusting the score of each of the one or more linking 
documents based on the identified weighting factor.”  Id. 
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Despite the important roles of the hyperlink as both a medium of 
communication and a message itself, the use of hyperlinks has been 
threatened.  Trademark, copyright, and contract law are often, but 
not exclusively, leveraged in an attempt to regulate the use of links 
online.  While the concerns motivating cases brought against hyper-
links are often legitimate, limiting the use of links poses a significant 
danger to communication and future innovation. 
One particularly egregious example of attempted hyperlink regu-
lation arose from an incident involving the Che Café Collective, a 
student organization at the University of California at San Diego 
(UCSD), which was asked by the university to delete hyperlinks to an 
alleged terrorist website from their UCSD-hosted website.  In a letter 
to the organization, a university official demanded that the organiza-
tion “immediately remove the [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co-
lombia (FARC)] from listing on the burn.ucsd.edu web site.”13 
School administrators told the group that linking to a site sup-
porting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was 
prohibited under the USA Patriot Act, which bans “providing ‘ma-
terial support to support terrorists.’”14  The university threatened dis-
ciplinary action if the group did not immediately remove the link to 
FARC.  In response to these threats, a number of free speech advo-
cates, including the American Association of University Professors, 
the American Civil Liberties Union, and the National Coalition 
Against Censorship, came to the aid of the Che Café Collective, ar-
guing that the university’s interpretation of the statute was inaccurate 
and overbroad in ways that threatened First Amendment rights on-
line.15  As one member from the Foundation for Individual Rights in 
Education noted, “All you’d have to do is declare someone a terrorist 
organization to prevent someone from knowing who the enemy is or 
what they [sic] stand for . . . . That’s not how democracy works.”16 
 
 13 E-mail from Gary R. Ratcliff, Dir. of Univ. Ctrs., Univ. of Cal., San Diego, to the Che Café 
Collective (Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/
2002/09/24/1511821.php. 
 14 Declan McCullagh, University Bans Controversial Links, CNET NEWS (Sept. 25, 2002), 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-959544.html. 
 15 See, e.g., Letter from the American Association of University Professors et al. to Robert 
Dynes, Chancellor, University of California, San Diego (Oct. 8, 2002), reprinted in U.C., 
San Diego Admits First Amendment Mistake After ABFFE and FEN Protest, BOOKSELLING THIS 
WEEK  (Oct. 10, 2002), http://news.bookweb.org/news/uc-san-diego-admits-first-
amendment-mistake-after-abffe-and-fen-protest (asking the university to reaffirm the First 
Amendment rights of the students and rescind the orders that were issued to students 
who ran the Che Café). 
 16 McCullagh, supra note 14 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Greg Lukianoff, 
Director of Legal Advocacy for the foundation for Individual Rights in Education). 
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The Che Café Collective example reminds us of the importance of 
applying the First Amendment as a limitation on the regulation of 
media and messages.  The First Amendment protects both the ve-
hicles through which we communicate and the communication itself.  
In the Che Café Collective example, the most overt free speech con-
cern arose because the university attempted to prohibit the dissemi-
nation of information about a State Department-designated terrorist 
organization on a university-hosted Web page.  The second order 
concern, however, was that the university demanded that a hyperlink 
on the Che Café Collective website, which merely connected users to 
another website, be removed from the website because the link con-
stituted “material support” to FARC. 
While media and messages are both protected under the First 
Amendment, they are not afforded equal protections under the law.  
Regulating platforms for speech, such as signs on utility poles, has 
traditionally been viewed by courts as “content-neutral” behavior be-
cause such regulation affects the medium regardless of the content 
traversing across it.17  Content-neutral laws, while implicating First 
Amendment rights, are by and large subject to a less rigorous stan-
dard of review by the courts.  However, when laws attempt to limit 
speech based on the message conveyed, so-called “content-based” 
regulation, courts apply a considerably stricter standard of review. 
The line distinguishing content-neutral and content-based regula-
tion is conceptually clear but practically blurry.  For example, often 
times “time, place, and manner restrictions,” the paradigmatic con-
tent-neutral regulation, reduces the total quantity of public debate 
and thus have clear content-based effects.  Some content-neutral zon-
ing regulations, like those that restrict pamphleteering or the use of 
megaphones, effectively ban those means of expression “essential to 
the poorly financed causes of little people.”18  When a regulation is 
designed to be content-neutral but affects the total quantity or quality 
of speech or disproportionately affects a specific segment of the pop-
ulation, the distinction between content-neutral and content-based 
regulation becomes dangerously blurred. 
This blurring occurs often when regulating hyperlinks.  A law that 
would, for example, demand that websites obtain authorization be-
fore hyperlinking would appear to be content-neutral—it applies to 
 
 17 See, e.g., Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984) 
(holding that the city of Los Angeles could ban all signs, commercial and political, from 
being placed on city utility poles because the citizens had “ample alternative modes of 
communication” in the city). 
 18 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). 
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links regardless of the content linked to and regardless of the content 
within the link.  However, if a new political commentary blog is re-
quired to obtain permission from all of the news organizations it links 
to, it threatens the blog’s very existence for two main reasons.  First, 
attempting to obtain approval for all the links will likely be prohibi-
tively expensive and time-consuming.  Second, even if the blog owner 
is able to pay for the costs of obtaining permission to link, incum-
bents in the field have an incentive to deny her the ability to link to 
their sites.  If the blogger is unable to link to public websites—either 
because she cannot afford to or because the site(s) in question denies 
her permission to link—her credibility is undercut among her nas-
cent reader base, and her effectiveness at providing quick, thoughtful 
commentary to a broad reader base is reduced.  The net effect is that 
our new blogger’s likelihood of success is seriously threatened. 
Thus, such a regulation would both hurt the total quantity of pub-
lic debate and unfairly target poorly financed, independent bloggers.  
Furthermore, the regulation would likely negatively affect those caus-
es or viewpoints that are not covered by the mainstream media but 
instead are niche topics only covered by smaller, individual voices.19 
Recognizing the dynamic role of hyperlinks in modern-day com-
munication will help us assess the impact of laws that limit their use 
in a more thoughtful and rigorous manner.  This Article will explore 
the various communicative roles of hyperlinks and the legal claims 
that have been brought to attempt to limit their use.  Part I will de-
scribe the multi-faceted role hyperlinks play in how we communicate.  
Part II will then discuss the standard of review most applicable to the 
laws affecting hyperlink use.  Finally, Part III will explore the various 
legal claims brought against the use of hyperlinks and assess the merit 
of the claims under the standard articulated in Part II. 
I.  HYPERLINKS AS COMMUNICATION 
A.  Original Conception of Hyperlinks 
Tim Berners-Lee developed the World Wide Web in order to “re-
frame the way we use information.”20  His goal was to create a virtual 
 
 19 This hypothetical is no idle concern.  A number of companies, including National Public 
Radio, the Better Business Bureau, KPMG, and Fast Company have all had a history of 
demanding permission to link.  For a good review of such incidents, see Stephan Ott, 
Linking Policies—Permission or Fee for Linking?, LINKS & LAW, http://www.linksandlaw.com/
linkingcases-linkingpolicies.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
 20 TED2009, Tim Berners-Lee on the Next Web, TED (Mar. 2009), http://www.ted.com/
talks/lang/eng/tim_berners_lee_on_the_next_web.html. 
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documentation system through which people could share their doc-
uments with ease and speed.  This universal space of information was 
to be navigated via hypertext links, or hyperlinks.  For Berners-Lee, 
the value of the Web was obtained through the links that connected 
the documents in the ether.21  Without the links, the Web would have 
been an impenetrable mess.  Information would only be accessible if 
you knew the exact address of the information for which you were 
searching.  The Web, he argued, “looses [sic] its power if there are 
certain types of things to which you can’t link.”22  The hyperlink pro-
vided users with an innovative way to navigate the network.23 
Underpinning the Web is Berners-Lee’s fundamental belief that 
publicly available information should be easily accessible to the pub-
lic.24  If access to content is constrained, the ease with which people 
speak and share information on the Internet decreases.25  Because 
hyperlinks are the primary means of access, the robust use of hyper-
links became critical to free speech and information sharing on the 
Web. 
While the hyperlink was the sole means of navigation (outside of 
direct inputs of URLs) in the early days of the Internet, the dominant 
form of navigation over the one-trillion-plus unique URLs26 that com-
pose the World Wide Web today is the search engine.27  A search en-
gine, like Google, Bing, or Yahoo!, is a service that “helps its users lo-
cate content on the Internet.”28  Though search engines have 
replaced links as our preferred method of navigation over the Net, a 
quick peak under the hood shows that links fuel search engines.  As 
Professor James Grimmelmann describes, “powerful link-structure 
techniques involving study of which [W]eb pages link to which other 
pages have become the dominant [W]eb search paradigm.”29  This 
simply means that the Google/Bing/Yahoo! algorithm that returns a 
list of websites in response to your search query heavily relies on links 
 
 21 Id. 
 22 Tim Berners-Lee, Realising the Full Potential of the Web, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM 
(Apr. 1997), http://www.w3.org/1998/02/Potential.html. 
 23 TED2009, supra note 20. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Jesse Alpert & Nissan Hajaj, We Knew the Web Was Big . . ., OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (July 25, 
2008, 10:12 AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2008/07/we-knew-web-was-big.html. 
 27 James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6 (2007) 
(“Every major Internet application today is a search engine, contains a search engine, or 
depends on a search engine.”). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 10. 
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to determine which websites to list.  Thus, linking, even today, re-
mains critical to Web navigation. 
However, the use of hyperlinks has evolved over time.  This paper 
argues that in addition to its navigational function, hyperlinks should 
now also be recognized for their communicative capacity.  The mes-
sages hyperlinks communicate may be explicit, conveyed through the 
text or image provided by the hyperlink, or implicit, conveyed 
through the use of the link.  In this Section I will explore the variety 
of messages conveyed by links—from simple, straightforward address 
information to more complex notions of democratizing determina-
tions of social relevance. 
B.  Hyperlink as an Address 
A hyperlink that directs you to the New York Times website can 
simply display its textual URL—www.nytimes.com.  If I were to pro-
vide a textual URL hyperlink to the New York Times website in this ar-
ticle, I would be providing the virtual address of the New York Times.  
If I type “www.nytimes.com” into my browser, the browser uses the 
URL to determine where in the network the New York Times website 
lives.  The browser then goes to that place, gets the content that lives 
there, and displays it for me.  Consider the analog-world parallel—
the physical address of the New York Times building is 620 Eighth Ave-
nue, New York, NY 10018.  If I would give this address to a taxi driver 
in New York, he would take me to the front door of the New York 
Times building.  The taxi driver of the analog world is the hyperlink 
of the digital world—by giving both of these entities my destination 
location, they can take me there. 
 
C.  Hyperlink as a Signal of Preference or Opinion 
Hyperlinks can convey more than just addresses, of course.  Con-
sider the hyperlink www.fuckgeneralmotors.com, the use of which 
was litigated a few years ago.30  By placing that link on a personal blog 
or tweeting the link to friends, an individual is communicating much 
more than a Web address.  She is able to send a very clear expressive 
 
 30 Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enterprises, 177 F. Supp. 2d 661, 662 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (denying 
injunction to owner of trademarked website “ford.com” that sued owner of domain name 
“fuckgeneralmotors.com,” which provided a hyperlink to the “ford.com” website). 
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message through the text of the link itself.  In this instance, she is let-
ting the world know that she is not a great fan of General Motors. 
The hyperlink possesses the ability to serve as expression in part 
because, unlike physical addresses, which are constrained by the mu-
nicipally decided street names and numbers, Web addresses are 
created and personalized by the owners of the virtual real estate.  For 
example, when General Motors created its website, it was able to 
choose the domain name of the site, and it chose www.gm.com.  It 
could also have chosen www.generalmotors.com, 
www.chevyandmore.com, or any other domain name it so desired—
assuming the name was not already taken.31 
Because Web addresses can be personalized and, as a result, ex-
pressive, many people utilize links to convey specific messages.  The 
use of links in the “status message” option of instant messenger 
clients, as tweets on Twitter, or as status updates on Facebook is in-
creasingly popular.  As one Huffington Post commentator noted, 
“[b]efore Twitter and Facebook, there was only one place where you 
could broadcast your inane real-time status updates and make sure all 
your friends clicked on that hilarious link or read the Goo Goo Dolls 
lyrics that totally reflected what you were going through:  the away 
message.”32  For applications where the space to communicate is li-
mited, like on Twitter, links can prove to be an especially effective 
tool to communicate what users are finding interesting, amusing, or 
noteworthy at any given moment.  In fact, the use of links on Twitter 
has become so popular that one of the search functions Twitter offers 
its users is the ability to search for Tweets that contain links. 
I began to really notice the use of links as away messages during 
the 2008 elections, when there was a contingent of individuals on my 
Google Chat (Gchat) buddy list that linked exclusively to Politico, Dai-
ly Kos, or Talking Points Memo.  Now, I have noticed another group of 
individuals who perennially link to articles from The Onion or clips 
from The Daily Show with Jon Stewart.  By posting these links, my col-
 
 31 Website owners often do not choose their IP address.  An IP address is the numerical ad-
dress that corresponds to a website’s domain name.  The American Registry for Internet 
Numbers distributes IP addresses in the United States.  General Motors’s IP address is 
170.224.60.167.  While GM could have chosen a number of domain names to correspond 
with this IP address, they were likely just assigned the numbers that compose their IP ad-
dress.  For more information on how the Internet distributes IP addresses and domain 
names, see What Does ICANN Do?, INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES & NUMBERS, 
http://www.icann.org/en/participate/what-icann-do.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
 32 Fernanda Diaz, The Easiest Thing You’ll Ever Do to Help Obama Win the Election:  Donate Your 
Away Message, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 10, 2008, 9:42 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fernanda-diaz/the-easiest-thing-youll-e_b_133531.html. 
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leagues communicate what they are thinking about (or at least what 
they want people to think they are thinking about).  Even when I do 
not always click on their posted links to read the Daily Kos article or to 
watch The Daily Show video, I know those colleagues are thinking 
about progressive politics or enjoying ironic humor.  This is because 
the links display the domain name of the site and I have some know-
ledge of the contents of the site.  Because most links to clips of The 
Daily Show contain “www.thedailyshow.com” somewhere in the longer 
link, I can draw inferences about the content and the linker based on 
the text of the link.  Put differently, because links are composed of 
Web address content, they are inherently expressive, offering indi-
viduals an opportunity to communicate their interests to their friends 
and the public at large.33 
My experience is not unique.  During the 2008 Presidential cam-
paign, Seth Flaxman created a website www.weapprovethismessage.
com, which asked visitors to post its URL in their away messages 
through Election Day in order to help spread accurate and compel-
ling information about then-candidate Barack Obama.  Explaining 
his inspiration for the website, Flaxman noted two things—that his 
own Gchat away message had been politicized since September 2007 
and that people are more likely to read a friend’s away message than 
a traditional news source.34  As the popularity of linking to this site 
grew, “weapprovethismessage.com” became a bumper sticker in sup-
port of Obama.  It grew beyond its original function of informing the 
uninformed and became a symbol of solidarity and support behind 
then-candidate Obama. 
Just as away messages and status updates allow Gchat and Face-
book users to use links to communicate their preferences and opi-
nions, blogrolls allow website owners to use links to signal their prefe-
rences and opinions.  Blogrolls are lists of links to sites that the 
blogger likes, and a recent study shows that two in five bloggers 
(41%) keep a blogroll.35 
A company like Google signals its public policy perspective 
through its blogroll by including links to 463 Blog:  Inside Tech Policy, 
CDT—PolicyBeta, Cisco High Tech Policy Blog, CNET Politics Blog, EFF:  
 
 33 Notably, the Web address itself, even if not hyperlinked, is also expressive.  However, as 
the rest of this Section will illustrate, there are expressive capabilities that are unique to 
hyperlinks that are not available with plain text Web addresses. 
 34 Diaz, supra note 32. 
 35 AMANDA LENHART & SUSANNAH FOX, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, BLOGGERS:  A 
PORTRAIT OF THE INTERNET’S NEW STORYTELLERS at iv (2006), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2006/PIP%20Bloggers%20Repor
t%20July%2019%202006.pdf.pdf. 
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DeepLinks, Hillicon Valley, Intel Policy Blog, John Palfrey’s Blog, Lessig Blog, 
Peter Fleischer:  Privacy . . . ?, and Public Knowledge Blog.36  Knowing 
something about the content on the blogs listed on Google’s blogroll 
gives its readers a sense of the content of Google Public Policy Blog with-
out reading a single post. 
Blogrolls also speak to the preferences of new readers, telling 
them what the given blog is similar to—a type of “if you liked them, 
you’ll like me” service.  Consider the blogroll of the Center for De-
mocracy and Technology (CDT),37 an advocacy organization dedicat-
ed to keeping the Internet “open, innovative, [and] free.”38  Among 
the blogs included in CDT’s blogroll are Public Knowledge, EFF:  Deep-
Links, Technology Liberation Front, and the American Constitution Society.  
These blogs often take substantively similar positions on Internet is-
sues.  In this way, the links communicate a context or a frame of ref-
erence to visitors of CDT’s website, which allows them to make a 
judgment on the type of content they should expect to encounter on 
the site. 
The analog to the blogroll in the physical world would be the 
choice use of reviews praising a new book that often occupy its back 
cover.  These quotations are selected not only based on the substance 
of the quote, but based on the authors of the quotations.  A quota-
tion from the New York Review of Books signals something entirely dif-
ferent than a quotation from the Wall Street Journal.  For example, the 
back panel of Professor Tim Wu’s new book, The Master Switch:  The 
Rise and Fall of Information Empires, includes reviews from Arianna 
Huffington of the Huffington Post, Josh Silverman of Skype, David 
Leonhardt of the New York Times Book Review, and Cory Doctorow of 
Boing Boing.39  Though not all of the reviews are from left-leaning 
individuals, the majority of the reviews are from members of the lib-
eral Technorati whose names will trigger assumptions for the reader 
about the substance of the book. 
As demonstrated by the use of hyperlinks on status messages and 
blogrolls, communicating preference and opinion is an important 
and common role for hyperlinks.  Next, we will look at the role of 
hyperlinks in online activism. 
 
 36 GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG, http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com (last visited Mar. 27, 
2011). 
 37 CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., http://www.cdt.org/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
 38 Id. 
 39 For an example of the reviews featured on Professor Wu’s book, see Review Quotes:  Praise 
for Tim Wu’s The Master Switch, RANDOM HOUSE, http://www.randomhouse.ca/catalog/
display.pperl?isbn=9780307269935 (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
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D.  Hyperlink as a Signature on a Virtual Petition 
Hyperlinks are also used to show support for a cause—a virtual 
signature on a petition.  Gaza Youth Breaks Out (GYBO) is a group of 
Gaza youth who are tired of Palestinian and Israeli violence.  Their 
Facebook page contains their manifesto and a list of ways supporters 
can aid in their efforts.  Number one on the list of ways supporters 
can help out is “[p]romoting [their] manifesto by sharing it on 
[their] profile on Facebook.”40 
In 2008, Google undertook a large campaign to pressure the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) to free unused and under-
used spectrum.41  The campaign was entirely virtual—it featured a 
website, www.freetheairwaves.com, that provided visitors information 
on the effort, an opportunity to email a letter to the FCC encourag-
ing them to free up the spectrum, and YouTube videos featuring 
Google employees, academics, and public interest representatives all 
describing the various benefits of unlicensed spectrum.  Because of 
the Web-based nature of Google’s campaign, word was spread by in-
dividuals linking to the website in a move described by Ars Technica as 
a “linked advertising campaign.”42  Linking to the website was a very 
public signal of support.  With many influential people in the tele-
com/Internet policy world, such as Professors Susan Crawford and 
Lawrence Lessig, linking to the website, the campaign garnered 
much attention in the media and ultimately was successful in achiev-
ing its goal.43 
Both the GYBO and the Google example illustrate the linking as 
activism argument.  This argument has been put forth before. 
 
 40 Gaza Youth Breaks Out (GYBO), FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/Gaza-Youth-
Breaks-Out-GYBO/118914244840679?v=info (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
 41 The “Free the Airwaves” campaign was dedicated to freeing up white spaces.  The white 
spaces are those spectrum bands between occupied radio bands or channels that remain 
unused to prevent interference.  The need for white spaces has become greatly dimi-
nished as digital signaling has replaced analog signaling as well as with the advancement 
of devices to prevent interference.  For more information, see Time to “Free the Airwaves,” 
OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Aug. 18, 2008, 5:59 AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/
2008/08/time-to-free-airwaves.html. 
 42 Nate Anderson, Google White Space Petition:  13,000 Signatures and Counting, ARS TECHNICA 
(Sept. 02, 2008, 8:15 AM), http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080902-google-
white-space-petition-13000-signatures-and-counting.html. 
 43 See, e.g., Susan Crawford, Two Possibly Related Developments, SUSAN CRAWFORD BLOG (Aug. 
18, 2008), http://scrawford.net/blog/two-possibly-related-developments/1234/; Law-
rence Lessig, Free the Airwaves:  Whitespace Campaign, LESSIG 2.0 (Aug. 20, 2008, 12:12 AM), 
http://lessig.org/blog/2008/08/free_the_airwaves_whitespace_c.html. 
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In the case of Universal City Studios v. Corley,44 defendant Eric Cor-
ley and his magazine, 2600, were hosting DeCSS code on their web-
site, which allowed Linux users to play CSS-encrypted DVDs on their 
systems.  At that time, without the DeCSS code, it was impossible to 
play a legally obtained, encrypted DVD on a machine running Linux 
as its operating system.  Because of this posting, Corley raised the ire 
of a number of Hollywood studios, one of which was Universal City 
Studios.  The studios sent him cease and desist letters and threatened 
legal recourse. In response, Corley invited supporters to “mirror” the 
DeCSS files on their own websites and created a Web page within his 
own site that contained links to the supporters’ websites.  Members of 
the Openlaw Forum at Harvard University argued in an amicus brief 
filed on behalf of Corley that his publication of the Web page con-
taining links of his supporters’ websites was a “protest akin to a union 
picket line or peaceful demonstration.”45  The brief further argued 
that just as “advertisers in the New York Times list their sponsors,”46  
Corley simply gave his readers the websites at which his supporters 
could be contacted and their speech read.  Site owners “choose to 
express their political support not only by writing and hosting the 
linked [W]eb pages but by ‘signing’ the magazine’s list and making 
their pages publicly visible.”47 
Preserving the ability of individuals to link in these instances is 
important.  It ensures that people can engage in digital activism, cast-
ing their support for causes and issues on the Internet.  As the mem-
bers of the Openlaw forum explained: 
[T]he multitude of links suggests that numerous people support 2600’s 
fight for fair use of digital media; they express a shared view that reverse 
engineering justifies bypassing access controls; they imply that DeCSS is 
still easy to obtain and that an injunction against a single Web publisher 
will be ineffective to stem dissemination of DeCSS.  It is not a message 
plaintiffs want to hear, but it is still not one they can block from the 
Web.48 
E.  Hyperlink as a Membership Card 
A closely related point is the way in which hyperlinks signal associ-
ation on the Web.49  Consider the use of hyperlinks on the social net-
 
 44 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 45 Brief for Openlaw Participants, supra note 4. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See, e.g., Tim Bonnemann, 14 Facebook Groups for the Dialogue, Deliberation, Public Participa-
tion, E-government, and E-democracy Community, INTELLITICS (May 9, 2008), 
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working service, Facebook.  Facebook allows members to create 
groups that others can join independently or by invitation.  These 
groups are commonplace on Facebook.  An individual lists hyperlinks 
connecting viewers to her groups’ Facebook pages on her profile 
page.  Clicking on the links allows viewers of the profile to under-
stand more about the groups. 
The groups range from general—for example, “UPenn Alumni”—
to specific—for example, “People Who Always Have to Spell Their 
Names for Other People.”50  When a member of a group displays her 
membership to a given group by including a link to the group’s Web 
page on her profile, she is publicly associating and assembling 
around a cause or interest.  Seeing that one’s friends or peer group 
are members of a certain group increases the likelihood that an indi-
vidual will join that group.  Thus, an individual linking to display 
membership signals association and potentially even encourages fur-
ther association by friends and peers.  Facebook is just one example 
of the opportunity to assemble through hyperlinks.  Other social 
networking websites with similar opportunities include LinkedIn, 
MySpace, and Doostang.51 
Of course, the ability to link to signal membership is not limited 
to the world of social networking sites.  The example above of the 
Obama supporters that linked to www.weapprovethismessage.com is 
also an example of how linking can create a loosely affiliated group of 
individuals assembled around a given cause or idea.  In that instance, 
there was no organized member list, but there was an affiliation 
among mutual linkers.  As Fernanda Diaz explained, 
Last week, before I had heard anything about the project, [www.]
weapprovethismessage.com took over most my Gchat friends list’s status 
boxes—a curious development which led me to click on it and marvel at 
the simple brilliance of its idea.  It’s such a great way to centralize support in a 
pervasive yet subtle manner . . . .52 
 
http://www.intellitics.com/blog/2008/05/09/14-facebook-groups-for-the-dialogue-
deliberation-public-participation-e-government-and-e-democracy-community/ (listing var-
ious groups on Facebook that deal with different facets of “dialogue, deliberation, public 
participation, e-government, and e-democracy”). 
 50 See, e.g., Amit Agarwal, The Ten Facebook Groups That Are Funny but Quite Popular, DIGITAL 
INSPIRATION (Aug. 27, 2007), http://labnol.blogspot.com/2007/08/ten-facebook-groups-
that-are-funny-but.html. 
 51 LinkedIn and Doostang use linking among individuals’ profiles as a way to highlight pro-
fessional associations and networks.  LinkedIn is an increasingly important tool to estab-
lish business and relationship networks that allow those “linked in” to get jobs and make 
new contacts.  (MySpace is more of an all-purpose social networking site, like Facebook.) 
 52 Diaz, supra note 32. 
May 2011] PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT 1033 
 
F.  “The Medium Is the Message” 
In addition to the explicit messages about address, preference, 
support, and membership, hyperlinks also convey messages simply 
through their use.  The substance of this implicit communication is 
derived from the nature of the medium itself.  The notion that a me-
dium of speech is able to independently transmit a message was first 
articulated by Marshall McLuhan when he boldly declared that “the 
medium is the message.”53  The medium, McLuhan argued, “shapes 
and controls the scale and form of human association and action.”54  
David Sarnoff, founder of the National Broadcasting Company and a 
pioneer in the American radio and television industries, once de-
scribed technology as devoid of an independent message.  Sarnoff 
said, “[t]he products of modern science are not in themselves good 
or bad; it is the way they are used that determines their value.”55  
McLuhan stands in stark contrast to this view and characterizes Sar-
noff’s representation of technology as “the voice of the current som-
nambulism.”56  McLuhan argued that such a view is analogous to say-
ing that “[f]irearms are in themselves neither good nor bad; it is the 
way they are used that determines their value.”57  Technology, McLu-
han compellingly argued, is imbued with value and conveys a message 
independent of the content it transmits. 
One of McLuhan’s most prominent examples is the electric light.  
McLuhan found that the electric light sends a message about the irre-
levance of traditional signals of time and place.  “The electric light 
ended the regime of night and day, of indoors and out-of-doors 
. . . . Cars can travel all night, ball players can play all night, and win-
dows can be left out of buildings.  In a word, the message of the elec-
tric light is total change.”58 
Perhaps the most striking element of McLuhan’s idea is the subtle 
but pervasive effect the medium has on how society views and engag-
es with the world.  The electric light created a social revolution.  
People could remain active after sundown.  Windows, for the first 
time, could be viewed as a design element to a building.  Just as the 
steam engine catalyzed how we build and create, the electric light re-
volutionized how we interact.  In both the case of the steam engine 
 
 53 MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA:  THE EXTENSION OF MAN 23 (2d ed., New 
American Library 1964) (emphasis added). 
 54 Id. at 24. 
 55 Id. at 26. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. at 60. 
1034 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:4 
 
and the electric light, the catalytic effect on society soon becomes as-
sociated with the use of the medium to the point where the medium 
begins to convey a message of total change.  As McLuhan described, 
“[t]he effects of technology do not occur at the level of opinions or 
concepts, but alter sense ratios or patterns of perception steadily and 
without any resistance.”59  McLuhan argued that when a person views 
a sign constructed with electric light, though she reads and con-
sciously processes the contents of the sign, she is subconsciously 
processing its message of total change. 
Like the electric light did years ago, the hyperlink conveys today’s 
message of total change.  It conveys a message of incredible speed, 
decentralized power, and universal access.  The hyperlink embodies 
the ability to have all of the world’s information, created by all of the 
world’s people, merely one click away.  The balance of this Section 
will explore the various implicit messages that are delivered by hyper-
links. 
G.  Hyperlink as Total Change 
To grasp the message expressed by hyperlinks, compare it to a 
Web address that is not hyperlinked:  The latter, in its jet black, plain 
text conveys a simple, staid, traditional message.  The former, with its 
bright blue, underlined font sends a significantly more exciting mes-
sage.  It is the lynchpin that ties together the virtual, universal docu-
mentation system through which people can communicate with ease 
and speed.  It serves as our access point to a massive Web of people, 
places, and information.  Because of its role, the hyperlink has come 
to embody the decentralization, speed, interactivity, universality, and 
access that is the Internet.  The link has become a symbol of the 
technology it facilitates. 
Consider the way in which we consume information.  I am no 
longer limited to getting my news soley from the big three broadcast-
ing networks.  Now I can follow the links in my Twitter feeds to iden-
tify today’s top stories.  Alternatively, I can visit my news aggregator of 
choice and skim through the headlines of a range of news organiza-
tions, big and small.  Neither of these would be possible without links.  
The link facilitates a decentralized model of news distribution.  In 
addition to decentralizing the distribution of news, links have decen-
tralized the creation of news.  Everyone can now actively contribute to 
social relevance because the determinant of relevance is no longer 
 
 59 Id. at 33. 
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just the prerogative of the owner of the news source.  Now, our col-
lective linking behavior determines social relevance and creates In-
ternet memes. 
In 1945, the Supreme Court declared that the “widest possible dis-
semination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is 
essential to the welfare of the public” and “that a free press is a condi-
tion of a free society.”60  The media industry today is highly concen-
trated with only six companies dominating the U.S. market—the Walt 
Disney Company, NBC (formerly owned by GE, now owned by Com-
cast), Time Warner, Viacom, News Corporation, and CBS.61  The In-
ternet allows smaller players to enter this media landscape.  Matt 
Drudge of Drudge Report describes his publication as “‘citizen journal-
ism,’ releasing stories that the mainstream media either does not 
know about or refuses to publish.”62  This more decentralized media 
is made possible because of hyperlinks, and as such has become an 
important message communicated by the use of hyperlinks.  Restric-
tions on hyperlinks limit the communication of that message. 
Links also convey a message of speed because of the speed with 
which they allow individuals to obtain information on the Web.  Links 
facilitate access to a website with the simple click of a button.  The al-
ternative would require typing or copying the website’s URL directly 
into the browser’s address bar.  Hyperlinks are like digital footnotes 
where instead of having to copy down the call number and search the 
library stacks for the referenced information, one simply has to click 
a button and the referenced information pops up on the screen.  The 
speed with which people can search and access information on the 
Web is unprecedented, and because of the role hyperlinks play in fa-
cilitating that speed, the appearance of hyperlinks has come to em-
body the promise of exceptional speed. 
Hyperlinks also represent interactive communication.  Whereas 
the analog world is characterized by one-way communication, the dig-
ital world is two-way.  The reader interacts with the content.  Hyper-
links facilitate active reading by enabling individuals to engage with 
the content by clicking on words and images therein that connect 
them to other, related content.  While the analog world limits the 
reader to a passive role, merely receiving the words on the page, 
 
 60 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). 
 61 See Ownership Chart:  The Big Six, FREE PRESS, http://www.freepress.net/ownership/
chart/main (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (laying out basic information regarding the larg-
est media firms in the United States, including their yearly revenues and holdings). 
 62 Profile:  Matt Drudge, BBC NEWS, (Feb. 29, 2008, 12:24 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/uk/7270685.stm. 
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hyperlinks remind and encourage the reader to dive deeper by click-
ing on the links. 
Universality is another message conveyed though links.  Links are 
the internationally used Dewey Decimal system for the entirety of the 
Web.  The whole of the World Wide Web, at home and abroad, is 
structured and accessible via links.  Not only do they connect people 
to the universe of information indexed on the Web, but they do so 
across the globe. 
Finally, and closely linked to universality, hyperlinks have become 
a symbol for access.  My right index finger can bring the universe of 
information to my computer screen.  Imagine reading a column in 
the New York Times about the Supreme Court’s latest decision.  The 
column is peppered with bright blue, underlined words.  The case 
name is one of these linked words, and one click takes me to the opi-
nion available through the Legal Information Institute at Cornell 
University.  Reading the opinion, I see more linked words that take 
me to the important cases the Court relied on to come to their deci-
sion as well as the lower court decision and any relevant statutes.  All 
of this information is available to anyone with access to a computer 
and an Internet connection. 
The hyperlink has revolutionized what we say, whom we say it to, 
and how we say it.  It has fundamentally changed communication.  
For this reason, the hyperlink is now imbued with that message of to-
tal change.  It is, as the electric light and steam engine were, a symbol 
of change and reminder of a new way of life.  In the next section, we 
will explore the way in which hyperlinks convey two other important 
messages—democracy and credibility. 
H.  Hyperlink as Democracy 
The presence of a link reminds users of the democratic nature of 
the Internet.  Links are powerful tools placed in the hands of every 
Internet user to push an obscure idea into national relevance.  
Google search results have quickly become an important barometer 
for social relevance.  As described above, Google’s search engine al-
gorithm determines the relevance of a given page based in large part 
on the frequency of links to that page.  This ability of linking to push 
websites up from obscurity to prominence means that linking allows 
individuals to participate in the determination of the relevance of in-
formation on a national level.  PageRank shifted the control from the 
creator of Web content to the consumer of Web content.  The ability 
to use a hyperlink as a vote in this national debate highlights the very 
fundamental way in which links behave like speech. 
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Never was this idea more salient than in 2005 when a query for 
“miserable failure” or “failure” on Google’s search engine returned 
President George W. Bush’s biography, as found on the White House 
website, as the number one-ranked site.63  This prank was the result of 
a coordinated effort by Web users to manipulate the Google search 
algorithm, an effort known as Googlebombing.  To Googlebomb 
President Bush, the pranksters had a large number of websites link to 
the official White House website using the same anchor text—
“miserable failure”—so as to trick the Google algorithm into thinking 
that the linked-to website was the authoritative source for information 
about the anchor text of the hyperlink.64  Googlebombing, though a 
subversive application of the phenomenon, exemplifies the ability of 
linking to bestow upon the information-consuming public the ability 
to push certain issues, stories, and ideas into national and interna-
tional relevance.   
I.  Hyperlink as a Signal of Credibility 
More than ten years ago, Jakob Nielsen, a well-renowned Web 
usability expert, said that “[n]ot being afraid to link to other sites is a 
sign of confidence, and third-party sites are much more credible than 
anything you can say yourself.  Isolated sites feel like they have some-
thing to hide.”65  Through their role as clickable internal citations, a 
hyperlink indicates factual accuracy or support, which increases the 
credibility of the site containing the link. 
The defendants in Universal City Studios v. Corley argued this posi-
tion in court, explaining that an online publication reporting on the 
newly developed DRM-circumventing DeCSS code was required to link 
to the code if the article was to carry any credibility among its reader-
ship.66  Whether the readers clicked on it or not, that the article provided 
a link to the code was sufficient to communicate to readers that what 
they were reading was supported by fact.  Corley linked to the DeCSS 
code because “in a journalistic world, . . . [y]ou have to show your 
 
 63 Marisa Mayer, Googlebombing ‘Failure,’ OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Sept. 16, 2005, 12:54 PM), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2005/09/googlebombing-failure.html (explaining how 
the practice of “googlebombing” by pranksters caused a biographical page on the White 
House’s website to be the top result based off of a search of the word “failure”). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Jakob Nielsen, Trust or Bust:  Communicating Trustworthiness in Web Design, USEIT.COM, 
(Mar. 7, 1999), http://www.useit.com/alertbox/990307.html. 
 66 See Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 439 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (referring to defendant Corley’s argument that not adding the link was 
equivalent to “printing a story about a picture and not printing the picture”). 
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evidence[,] . . . and particularly in the magazine that [he] work[ed] 
for, people want to see specifically what it is that [they] are referring 
to, including what evidence . . . [they] have.”67  In this way, a hyper-
link indicates to readers that the supporting materials can be viewed 
with merely a click and communicates credibility to viewers. 
By providing credibility, hyperlinks help smaller Internet publish-
ers flourish and facilitate the creation of a journalistic model pre-
mised upon decentralized media sources as discussed above.  Convey-
ing credibility is of utmost importance in establishing a new 
publication.  The credibility of the avidly read and referenced online 
investigative reporting publication, Drudge Report, is in part due to its 
practice of providing links to its sources.68  Starting with breaking the 
Monica Lewinsky scandal in 1998, Drudge Report, despite its low budg-
et and simple website consisting largely of links to other sources, has 
become recognized as an important, legitimate news source.69  Wiki-
pedia and Wikileaks are also paradigms of this point.  Both sources of 
information rely heavily on links to establish credibility.  Wikipedia 
itself describes the “[i]dentification of reputable third-party sources 
as citations” as one of the key metrics in measuring credibility.70  Simi-
larly, Wikileaks makes clear that they do not accept rumor, opinion, 
or other kinds of first-hand accounts because the Wikileaks journalists 
“write news stories based on the material, and then provide a link to 
the supporting documentation to prove [their] stories are true.”71 
The successes of these online publications lie in their ability to es-
tablish credibility.  The “most frequently reported journalistic activi-
ties” among bloggers outside of writing are fact-checking and linking 
“to original source material that has been cited or in some way used 
in a post.”72  Furthermore, one study found that while traditional 
blogs link about as often as the websites of traditional news organiza-
tions, they link to external sites far more frequently.  The study 
showed that “more than a third of the links of the Huffington Post 
and Daily Kos and over three-quarters of the links of Think Progress 
 
 67 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68 Profile:  Matt Drudge, supra, note 62 (describing Drudge Report as “required reading for 
journalists and politicians in the United States”). 
 69 See, e.g., id. (citing Drudge Report as the first news source to run the story on the affair be-
tween President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky). 
 70 Reliability of Wikipedia, WIKIPEDIA,  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reliability_of_Wikipedia 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
 71 Submissions, WIKILEAKS, http://213.251.145.96/Submissions.html (last visited Mar. 27, 
2011). 
 72 LENHART & FOX, supra note 35, at 11 (reporting findings that 35% of surveyed bloggers 
“often” spend extra time verifying the facts they post). 
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and Michelle Malkin pointed to external [web]sites.”73  Comparative-
ly, political news articles in the New York Times linked externally less 
than one percent of the time.74 
In addition to the credibility linking lends to smaller news outfits, 
referential links are critical to the provision of news generally.  As the 
number of online sources grows with each new blog, video website, 
and news service, comprehensive reporting is reliant on linking to 
these news sources instead of developing original content for every 
single news story.  Referential links allow large media organizations to 
provide coverage of a variety of issues, including municipal-level is-
sues, for its readers.  For example, the Boston Globe provides a “Your 
Town” section on its website where readers can get more local news 
based on where they live.75  The way the Boston Globe does this is, in 
part, by linking to smaller, local news media organizations that cover 
local news in more depth than the Boston Globe’s own reporters do. 
Furthermore, referential links are critical to the success of aggre-
gators—services like Google News or the Huffington Post—that collect 
and post the headlines and leads of stories posted on third party news 
sites, and embed the content with links to the sites on which the full 
story can be found.  Aggregators allow us to receive and process news 
not only in a way that ensures broad exposure to information, but al-
so recognizes the time and cognitive capacity constraints that limit 
our ability to process a lot of information.  The link signals credibility 
of the aggregation site to the user.  Were Google News to simply list 
snippets without the link, people might not trust the aggregator as 
much. 
Whether by conveying credibility or allowing us to show our sup-
port for a cause, hyperlinks communicate to their audience.  This 
ability to communicate, in conjunction with their critically important 
role as a vehicle for communication, means limiting the use of hyper-
links should be done with utmost care and an acute understanding of 
the resulting impact on our ability to communicate on the Web.  In 
the next Section, I will discuss how we have traditionally regulated 
various types of speech. 
 
 73 Lokman Tsui, The Hyperlink in Newspapers and Blogs, in THE HYPERLINKED SOCIETY:  
QUESTIONING CONNECTIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 70, 79 (Joseph Turow & Lokman Tsui 
eds., 2008). 
 74 Id. (referring also to the Washington Post for linking its political news articles to external 
websites). 
 75 Your Town, BOSTON.COM, http://www.boston.com/yourtown/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
1040 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:4 
 
II.  REGULATING SPEECH 
Despite the protections of the First Amendment, historically 
speech can be subject to regulation.  Regulation that turns on the 
speech itself is said to be content-based and triggers a higher level of 
scrutiny from the courts.  On the other hand, regulation that turns 
on the medium or mode of communication is an example of a con-
tent-neutral regulation and is generally subject to a much lower stan-
dard of judicial review.  Because hyperlinks both deliver messages 
and function as conduits for messages, regulation of hyperlinks can 
theoretically be categorized as either content-based or content-
neutral.  Though distinct, these two roles of hyperlinks are in many 
ways inextricably linked.  For example, if Wikipedia is ordered to de-
link from a third party source but is allowed to include a formal cita-
tion to that source, the site loses some of its credibility.  There is 
something immediately less believable about the content if it lacks 
links.  Thus, regulating links requires us to tread the thin line be-
tween content-based and content-neutral regulation.  It is precisely 
because of this difficulty that I argue that hyperlinks should be pro-
tected under some form of strict scrutiny review. 
In this Section, I will first review how courts have traditionally 
treated content-based and content-neutral regulation. 
A.  Content-Based Regulation 
The First Amendment, though clear in its language, has been in-
terpreted in a way that recognizes the various types of speech that ex-
ist and the differing levels of societal importance accorded to each.76  
The First Amendment has been applied in a manner that reflects the 
balance of all relevant interests.  Consequently, there is no single 
standard of review under which to consider the constitutionality of a 
 
 76 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988) (instituting a 
balancing test that accords significant deference to school officials evaluating speech 
rights of students in public schools); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (establishing a four-part test for commercial speech); 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 39 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the ma-
jority had created a three-prong test for obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 
448–49 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that a state statute, which criminalized using unlaw-
ful methods such as crime or violence as a means of achieving political reform, violated 
the First Amendment by punishing “mere advocacy” and by forbidding assembly with 
others “merely to advocate the described type of action”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 
395 U.S. 367, 399–401 (1969) (creating intermediate scrutiny standard for broadcast reg-
ulation); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (establishing know-
ing or reckless disregard as the truth or falsity standard for public official libels). 
May 2011] PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT 1041 
 
given law or regulation.  That being said, strict scrutiny is generally 
understood as the default test when dealing with a content-based 
regulation of speech,77 while intermediate scrutiny often applies to 
content-neutral regulation.78 
To test the constitutionality of content-based laws, the Supreme 
Court first establishes if the speech is so-called “low value” speech.  
The “two-level” theory of speech first appeared in Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, which stated that 
[C]ertain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech . . . . are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social val-
ue as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.79 
Since then, the Court has found that several classes of speech fall 
into this class of “low value” speech, including express incitement,80 
obscenity,81 false statements,82 and child pornography.83 
For speech not found to be of “low value,” the Court traditionally 
accords virtually absolute protection.84 
B.  Content-Neutral Regulation 
Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, are viewed much 
more permissively by the Court because, theoretically, such regula-
tions do not directly regulate speech.85  The Court has upheld prohi-
 
 77 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (holding that a content-
based regulation was unconstitutional because it was not reasonably necessary to achieve 
the alleged compelling interest). 
 78 See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (finding that when a regu-
lation prohibits conduct that combines “speech” and “nonspeech” elements, “a sufficient-
ly important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify inci-
dental limitations on First Amendment freedoms”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
 80 See, e.g., Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (holding that the “guarantees of free speech and 
free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of 
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”). 
 81 See, e.g., Miller, 413 U.S. at 23 (finding that obscene material is unprotected by the First 
Amendment). 
 82 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (stating that “there is no 
constitutional value in false statements of fact”). 
 83 See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (describing child pornography as 
“without the protection of the First Amendment”). 
 84 See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 48 (1987) 
(“[O]utside the realm of low-value speech, the Court has invalidated almost every con-
tent-based restriction that it has considered in the past thirty years.”). 
 85 See id. at 54 (stating that content-neutral regulations do not always receive “a minimal lev-
el of scrutiny” even though courts sometimes underestimate the First Amendment threats 
that such restrictions pose) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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bitions on the use of loudspeakers,86 the posting of signs on utility 
poles,87 and the destruction of draft cards88 as permissible content-
neutral regulations. 
Importantly, however, the Court has recognized instances where a 
regulation that is seemingly content-neutral in fact threatens free 
speech and, consequently, has applied a higher standard of review.  
For example, in Schneider v. New Jersey, the Court held that a content-
neutral ordinance, which prohibited any person from distributing 
leaflets in “any street or way” in an effort to keep the streets cleaner, 
was invalid.89  The Court reasoned that “the purpose to keep the 
streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an or-
dinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from 
handing literature to one willing to receive it.”90  Thus, in Schneider, 
the content-neutral legislation was determined to have too significant 
an impact on speech to justify the ordinance.  Alternatively put, the 
purpose of the ordinance was not sufficiently important to justify the 
restriction on speech that resulted. 
Similarly, in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,91 the Court held 
that an ordinance that banned virtually all billboards was unconstitu-
tional.  While a plurality found the ordinance to be an unconstitu-
tional content-based restriction, Justice Brennan and Justice Black-
mun found the ordinance to be an unconstitutional content-neutral 
restriction.  Justice Brennan’s concurrence expressed a concern with 
the “practical effect of the San Diego ordinance” which “eliminate[s] 
the billboard as an effective medium of communication.”92  Because 
of this effect, Justice Brennan felt the ordinance suffered grave con-
stitutional problems and suggested that in such instances, it is neces-
sary to assess the “substantiality of the governmental interests as-
 
 86 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 85 (1949) (upholding a city ordinance prohibiting any 
person from using any sound truck or other instrument that emits “loud and raucous 
noises” on any public street). 
 87 See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984) (holding 
that the city of Los Angeles could ban all signs, commercial and political, from being 
placed on city utility poles because the citizens had “ample alternative modes of commu-
nication” in the city). 
 88 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968) (holding that burning a draft card 
was not protected by the First Amendment because such an action threatens the function-
ing of the Selective Service). 
 89 Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 156 (1939). 
 90 Id. at 162. 
 91 453 U.S. 490, 521 (1981) (reasoning that the ordinance’s stated purpose of averting traf-
fic hazards did not constitute a government interest sufficient to outweigh private inter-
ests in free speech, and noting that the ordinance was limited to offsite billboards and did 
not ban onsite commercial advertising). 
 92 Id. at 525 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted). 
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serted” and “whether those interests could be served by means that 
would be less intrusive on activity protected by the First Amend-
ment.”93 
 In United States v. Grace,94 the Court struck down a statute on the 
grounds that it exceeded the government’s ability to permissibly re-
strict expressive conduct in public fora.  Specifically, the Court over-
turned a statute that prohibited “display [of] any flag, banner, or de-
vice designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, 
organization, or movement”95 because the statute was not sufficiently 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.96  The 
language the Court employs here is one strikingly similar to that used 
when the Court invokes a strict scrutiny standard generally applied to 
content-based regulation. 
These three cases highlight instances of content-neutral regula-
tion that were, despite the lower standard of scrutiny generally un-
derstood to apply to content-neutral regulation, found to be uncons-
titutional.  This then raises the question—when does the Court find a 
given content-neutral regulation constitutional? 
In undertaking a review of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
around content-neutral regulation, Professor Geoffrey Stone found 
that the Court, when assessing the constitutionality of content-neutral 
regulation, relies on not one uniform standard but rather on one of 
three distinct, flexible standards of review—deferential, intermediate, 
and strict—depending largely on the net effect of the regulation on 
speech.97  Thus, the particular facts of the case determine the stan-
dard applied. 
Stone found that content-neutral regulation generally triggers a 
deferential standard with the Court.98  This standard, Stone noted, 
“resembles the rational basis standard of equal protection review,” 
and under this standard the Court often upholds content-neutral laws 
if they rationally further legitimate governmental interests.99  The 
 
 93 Id. at 527 (quoting Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 70 (1981)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
 94 461 U.S. 171 (1983). 
 95 Id. at 172–73 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 96 See id. at 182 (“We do not denigrate the necessity to protect persons and property or to 
maintain proper order and decorum . . . but we do question whether a total ban on carry-
ing a flag, banner, or device on the public sidewalks substantially serves these purposes.”). 
 97 Stone, supra note 84, at 50. 
 98 Id. (“In many of its decisions assessing the constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions, 
the Court employs a deferential standard that resembles the rational basis standard of 
equal protection review.”). 
 99 Id. 
1044 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:4 
 
Court’s treatment of “time, place, and manner” restrictions is a para-
digmatic example of the deferential standard often applied to con-
tent-neutral regulations.  For example, in Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence, the defendant sought to sleep in parks outside of the 
campgrounds designated for camping as a protest in support of the 
plight of the homeless.100  The Court held that a park rule prohibiting 
sleeping in tents outside of designated campgrounds was constitu-
tional.  The Court found that  
All those who would resort to the parks must abide by otherwise valid 
rules for their use, just as they must observe the traffic laws, sanitation 
regulations, and laws to preserve the public peace.  This is no more than 
a reaffirmation that reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on 
expression are constitutionally acceptable.101 
The Court held that “[r]easonable time, place, or manner restric-
tions are valid even though they directly limit oral or written expres-
sion.”102  Even when demanding that a content-neutral restriction be 
limited such that it does no more than what is essential to further the 
intended goal, the Court has found that such a standard is met 
whenever the governmental interest “would be achieved less effective-
ly absent the regulation.”103  Many of the content-neutral standards 
the Court reviews are decided under this deferential standard. 
However, Stone found that the Court is not always so deferential.  
In some instances, the Court employs an intermediate standard of re-
view.  In applying the intermediate standard, the Court looks more 
deeply into the substantiality of the asserted governmental interest 
and demands the government prove that its use of a less restrictive 
alternative would seriously undermine substantial governmental in-
terests.104  For example, in Grace, the Court acknowledged the legiti-
macy of the government’s need to keep decorum,105 which motivated 
the federal law that prohibited the “display [of] any flag, banner, or 
device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, or-
ganization, or movement in the United States Supreme Court build-
 
100 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289-90 (1984). 
101 Id. at 298 (footnote omitted). 
102 Id. at 298 n.8. 
103 Stone, supra note 84, at 51 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Clark, 468 U.S. at 297 (upholding a sleeping 
prohibition in national parks because the regulation was reasonably designed to ensure 
that the parks were adequately protected);  Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for 
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 815–16 (1984) (rejecting the argument that a city is constitutional-
ly required to adopt an ordinance that would have had a less severe effect on the expres-
sive activity of plaintiffs). 
104 Stone, supra note 84, at 52. 
105 United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 182 (1983). 
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ing and on its grounds.”106  However, the Court still remained “un-
convinced that the prohibitions . . . sufficiently serve[d] that purpose 
to sustain its validity insofar as the public sidewalks on the perimeter 
of the grounds [we]re concerned.”107  Similarly, in Village of Schaum-
burg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,108 the Court held that a city 
should protect its citizens against fraud by requiring solicitors to in-
form the public of the uses made of their contributions, instead of 
imposing a blanket ban on solicitation. 
These cases highlight the fact that intermediate review enables a 
more searching review into the motivations and the effectiveness of a 
content-neutral regulation.  However, unlike in its application of 
strict scrutiny, which is often described as “strict in standard, fatal in 
fact,”109 the Court is still able to uphold the regulation in question if 
the relevant criteria are met. 
Moving next to strict scrutiny, Stone noted that when the Court 
applies its highest standard of review to a content-neutral regulation, 
it “focuses on the same considerations as intermediate review, but in-
sists on a compelling rather than substantial governmental interest 
and requires a showing that the challenged restriction is ‘necessary’ 
to achieve that interest.”110 
Though this textual difference seems marginal, the distinction is 
anything but.  Whereas regulations can survive intermediate scrutiny, 
the application of the strict scrutiny standard is often times fatal to 
the regulation in question.111 
What triggers this disparate treatment?  What does the Court look 
to when trying to determine which standard of scrutiny to apply?   
Stone suggests that the Court applies a stricter standard of review the 
 
106 Id. at 172–73 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
107 Id. at 183. 
108 444 U.S. 620, 637–38 (1980) (explaining how the village’s legitimate interest in prevent-
ing fraud could be achieved by less intrusive means than a blanket ban on solicitation). 
109  Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court , 1971 Term—Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (internal 
citations omitted). 
110 Stone, supra note 84, at 53. 
111 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 582–
83 (1983) (holding that Minnesota’s “use tax” violates the First Amendment); Brown v. 
Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91–92 (1982) (holding that the dis-
closure provisions of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law violate the First 
Amendment); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606–07 (1982) 
(holding that a Massachusetts statute providing for exlusion of the general public from 
trials of specified sexual offenses violates the First Amendment); NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415, 438–39 (1963) (holding that a Virginia statute broadening the definition of soli-
tication of legal business violates the First Amendment). 
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more free speech is threatened.112  Though content-neutral regula-
tion at the very least indirectly affects the ability of people to speak 
freely, the Court is concerned with the extent to which the speech is 
threatened.  However, the Court balances this concern with consid-
eration of the government’s need to regulate certain undesirable be-
haviors.  Thus, the Court has calibrated the balance such that the 
greater the threat to free speech and the weaker the countervailing 
government interest in regulation, the stricter the standard em-
ployed.  The two main factors that affect this calibration are (1) “the 
extent to which the challenged restriction reduces the total quantity 
of public debate,” and (2) “the extent to which the challenged re-
striction limits important opportunities for the free expression of par-
ticular groups, individuals, or causes.”113  Stone then illustrates his 
point by discussing a number of cases.  I will focus on two—Buckley v. 
Valeo114 and NAACP v. Button.115 
In Buckley, the Court invalidated the expenditure limitations of 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which prohibited any 
person from spending more than $1,000 on behalf of the campaign 
of any political candidate, but upheld the Act’s provisions that prohi-
bited any person from contributing more than $1,000 to a political 
candidate directly.116  Motivating the Court’s decision was the belief 
that the former provision had a severe effect on the opportunities for 
free expression while the latter provision allowed for alternate means 
of expression.  Specifically, the Court stated that the expenditure li-
mitation was a “restriction on the amount of money a person or 
group can spend on political communication” which “necessarily re-
duces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues 
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the au-
dience reached,”117 while the contribution limitation “entail[ed] only 
a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free 
communication.”118  Under the contribution limitation, the individual 
was still able to contribute to political action committees or other or-
ganizations formed to support the candidate. 
 
112 See Stone, supra note 84, at 58 (explaining the correlation between “the extent to which a 
challenged law actually interferes with the opportunities for free expression and the 
Court’s use of the strict, intermediate, and deferential standards of review”). 
113 Id. at 59. 
114 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
115 371 U.S. 415. 
116 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143. 
117 Id. at 19. 
118 Id. at 20–21. 
May 2011] PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT 1047 
 
When assessing the constitutionality of the contribution limita-
tion, the Court stated that it was “unnecessary to look beyond the 
Act’s primary purpose . . . in order to find a constitutionally sufficient 
justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation.”119  The Court ex-
plained that “[e]ven a significant interference with protected rights 
of political association may be sustained if the State demonstrates a 
sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to 
avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms.”120  This de-
ferential language stands in stark contrast to the Court’s discussion of 
the expenditure limitation, where it stated that “a primary effect of 
these expenditure limitations is to restrict the quantity of campaign 
speech by individuals, groups, and candidates.”121  The Court contin-
ued and found that while the restrictions were content-neutral, they 
“limit[ed] political expression ‘at the core of our electoral process 
and of the First Amendment freedoms.’”122  Because of the nature of 
and extent to which First Amendment rights were implicated, the 
constitutionality of the expenditure provisions turned on “whether 
the governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting 
scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of 
political expression.”123 
Thus the Court’s opinion in Buckley illustrates that the way in and 
extent to which First Amendment rights are affected determine the 
Court’s choice in standard of review.  Specifically, the Court reviewed 
regulations that fundamentally limited the opportunities for political 
expression under a strict scrutiny standard while it examined regula-
tions that merely curtailed a specific means of political expression but 
left open alternate vehicles under a lesser standard.  While the for-
mer necessarily reduces the quantity of speech, the latter does not. 
Regulating the use of links threatens to fundamentally limit op-
portunities for expression on the Web.  It would limit the opportuni-
ties for cultural expression, political expression, and everything in be-
tween.  If a blogger cannot link to the newspaper article upon which 
she is providing commentary, then she is unable to communicate 
credibility to her reader.  More importantly, without links, her blog 
post will never have a chance of making its way onto the first page of 
a Google search.  Were the hypothetical regulation to allow individu-
als to include Web addresses in their Tweets but prohibit hyperlinks, 
 
119 Id. at 26. 
120 Id. at 25 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121 Id. at 39. 
122 Id. (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)). 
123 Id. at 44–45 (emphasis added). 
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then that regulation would fundamentally alter the way we communi-
cate on the Web.  If an individual cannot include a link to a clip from 
yesterday’s Daily Show on her Facebook profile, then she is prohibited 
from communicating preferences using the language of the Web.  
Such a regulation would create a different language on the Web—a 
slower language, a less efficient language, resulting in a net decrease 
in the total amount of communication on the Web. 
A limitation on the use of hyperlinks is therefore more compara-
ble to the expenditure limitation than the contribution limitation at 
issue in Buckley and should be subject to a similarly exacting scrutiny.  
Like the expenditure limitation, regulation of hyperlinks will likely 
suffer from a constitutional defect because there are few alternatives 
to convey a message on the Web without hyperlinks.  The hyperlink is 
the virtual world’s currency.124 
In NAACP v. Button, the Court addressed an as-applied action aris-
ing from a Virginia law that prohibited any organization from retain-
ing a lawyer in connection with litigation to which it was not a party 
and in which it had no pecuniary right or liability.125  The Court held 
in favor of the NAACP and found the law unconstitutional as applied 
to the NAACP.  In the opinion, the Court recognized that, as applied 
to the NAACP, in Virginia, in the middle of the Second Reconstruc-
tion, the mere existence of such a law could effectively shut down the 
good work of the NAACP in defending the rights of African Ameri-
cans living in the South.126  In doing so, the Court stressed that for the 
NAACP, litigation is an important, unique, powerful form of political 
expression and association. 
Professor Stone made two important observations about Button.  
First, unlike in Buckley, the Button Court did not find the statute at is-
sue unconstitutional because it effectively prohibited “the reasonable 
use of virtually every means of communicating information,” but ra-
ther, because the law prohibited what was “the most effective form of 
political expression available.”127  In fact, the Virginia law left the 
NAACP free to pursue its objectives by a number of alternative means 
such as leafleting, picketing, newspapers, and political donations.  
 
124 While I related links to currency because of the discussion of Buckley, influential journalist 
Jeff Jarvis previously suggested this notion.  In a post on his blog, BuzzMachine, he wrote, 
“In this new world, links are currency.  Links grant authority.  Links build branding.  
Links equal value.”  Jeff Jarvis, Wired, BUZZMACHINE (Aug. 13, 2005, 10:23 AM), 
http://www.buzzmachine.com/2005/08/13/wired/. 
125 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
126 Id. at 434–36. 
127 See Stone, supra note 84, at 61 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18 n.17; Button, 371 U.S. at 
431) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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However, the Court acknowledged that leafleting could not supplant 
litigation.  As vehicles of speech, they were two entirely different 
beasts with two entirely different effects, audiences, and messages.  
Additionally, the Court seemingly supported the idea that a regula-
tion that forces a speaker to use an alternate vehicle of speech is un-
acceptable if that alternate vehicle is significantly less effective than 
the original vehicle.  Stone’s second observation is that in Button, the 
strict scrutiny applied resulted from two important and distinct fac-
tors:  “(1) the law substantially limited the availability (2) of a very 
important means of political action.”128  Stone’s articulation of the 
distinct factors is important—any law that limits the availability of a 
certain type of speech does not trigger strict scrutiny.  Rather, it is on-
ly those laws that limit valuable speech that raise important constitu-
tional concerns. 
Thus Buckley and Button both stand for the proposition that the 
content-neutral doctrine is an effects-based doctrine.  This means 
that of primary concern in assessing the constitutionality of a given 
content-neutral legislation is the net effect on valued speech.  A regu-
lation that encumbers a vehicle of expression such that it threatens 
the total quantity and quality of expression is subject to an exacting 
standard of scrutiny by the courts.  Furthermore, Stone notes, “in at 
least some circumstances, the Court will consider the severity of the 
restrictive effect of a content-neutral law as applied to different 
speakers, and thus hold such a law unconstitutional as applied to 
some speakers and constitutional as applied to others.”129  These two 
points are important to remember as we think about hyperlink regu-
lation in the next Part.  First, does the law in question limit the quan-
tity or quality of important expression?  Second, are there some con-
stituencies for whom this law is especially concerning?  When 
reviewing a content-neutral regulation of hyperlinks, the Court 
should seriously consider both of these questions. 
III.  REGULATING HYPERLINKS 
The First Amendment prohibits the government from restricting 
the freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right of people to 
peaceably assemble, and the right to petition the government for a 
 
128 See id. 
129 Stone, supra note 84, at 63 (discussing Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Committee, 
459 U.S. 87, 101–02 (1982), in which the Court held that a disclosure provision of Ohio’s 
campaign reporting law was unconstitutional as applied to the Socialist Workers Party).  
Notably, the Button case was also an as-applied challenge. 
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redress of grievances.130  Part I explained why, in many instances, 
hyperlinks should be categorized as one of these forms of protected 
communications.  Part II provided a loose framework with which to 
think about the constitutionality of regulations that limit the robust 
use of links.  This Part will consider various laws, such as trademark 
and copyright law, that have been used to challenge hyperlink use, 
and assess the constitutionality of their application. 
A.  Trademarks and Servicemarks 
A trademark or servicemark (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
“trademark” or “mark”) is any word, name, symbol, or device used by 
a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods or services and dis-
tinguish them from those manufactured and sold by others.131  The 
stated goal of trademark law is to secure to the owner of the mark the 
“good will of his business and protecting the public against spurious 
and falsely marked goods.”132  Thus, trademarks serve two important 
interests.  First, they ensure that consumers do not mistakenly pur-
chase one good, thinking it is another good.  The corollary to this 
point is that it ensures that trademark owners do not lose profits be-
cause of the deceptive actions of a third party.  Second, trademarks 
ensure that a seller’s good will and reputation are not diluted.  Dilu-
tion can occur by blurring or by tarnishment.133  The former occurs 
when customers simply see the mark used in the context of goods or 
services not produced by the trademark owner.  The latter occurs 
when the unauthorized use of a trademark actually harms the reputa-
tion of the product or the company associated with the trademark. 
To bring a trademark infringement action, a plaintiff must show 
that the defendant has used the mark “in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services” 
and additionally, that the challenged use of the mark will cause con-
sumer confusion.134 
This confusion may arise as to the source, origin, sponsorship, or 
endorsement of the defendant’s product or service.  Courts consider 
a variety of factors to determine the likelihood of confusion, includ-
ing the strength of the original trademark,135 the similarity between 
 
130 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
131 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
132 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1274-75 (1946). 
133 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). 
134 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006). 
135 See Sally M. Abel, Likelihood of Confusion, in TRADEMARK LAW AND & THE INTERNET:  ISSUES, 
CASE LAW, AND PRACTICE TIPS 211, 211 & n.2 (Lisa E. Cristal & Neal S. Greenfield eds., 2d 
May 2011] PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT 1051 
 
the two marks,136 the similarity of the underlying good or service,137 
the similarity between the channels of trade between the two prod-
ucts,138 the sophistication of the target market,139 the wrongful intent 
of the potentially infringing user,140 evidence of actual confusion,141 
and whether the challenged use is within the original trademark 
owner’s zone of natural expansion.142  Ultimately, no mechanical rule 
determines likelihood of confusion, and each case requires a weigh-
ing of the facts and circumstances of the particular mark.143 
In order to establish a federal dilution claim, the trademark in 
question must be a “famous” mark, and the defendant must be en-
gaged in a commercial use of that mark that is likely to cause dilution 
by blurring its distinctiveness or disparaging the mark.144 
It is important to note that trademark law, like copyright law, re-
cognizes parody, news and commentary, nominative use,145 and other 
First Amendment-based defenses.146  Trademark law on the Internet 
has primarily been triggered by infringing behavior arising from the 
 
ed. 2001) (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 
1976)). 
136 Id. at n.3 (citing Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 925 (10th Cir. 
1986)). 
137 Id. at n.4 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2000); 
Elec. Design & Sales, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 717 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
138 Id. at n.5 (citing Blazon, Inc. v. Blazon Mobile Homes Corp., 416 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 
1969)). 
139 Id. at n.6 (citing Dynamics Research Corp. v. Langenau Mfg. Co., 704 F.2d 1575, 1576 
(Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
140 Id. at n.7 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 
1987)). 
141 Id. at n.8 (citing Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1543–45 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
142 Id. at n.9 (citing Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 
2000)). 
143 See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (recognizing how various evi-
dentiary factors play greater or lesser roles, depending on the particular determination). 
144 See Abel, supra note 134, at 229–30. 
145 For an excellent review of the dominant claims in linking law, see Mark Sableman, Link 
Law Revisited:  Internet Linking Law at Five Years, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1273, 1280 (2001), 
who, with respect to nominative use, writes: 
Not all use of another’s trademarks constitutes infringement.  Words that are 
trademarks may also be used in their normal descriptive sense.  In many cases, 
trademarks may describe a person, a place, or an attribute of a product.  For ex-
ample, one may say, “Let’s take a vacation to Disney World,” or, “I have the data in 
Excel,” without violating the trademark rights of Walt Disney or Microsoft.  Thus, 
trademark law recognizes a “nominative use” defense when the mark is used only 
“to describe the goods or services of [a] party, or their geographic origin.” 
  Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (Supp. V 
1999)). 
146 Id. at 1317. 
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questionable use of domain names147 and metatags.148  However, link-
ing has also triggered some trademark actions. 
In one early case on the subject, a court ruled that linking does 
not inherently create commercial dilution and would not issue an or-
der enjoining the defendant from linking to the plaintiff’s homepage 
simply because the plaintiff disapproved of the link.149  In that case, 
Eric Corley and his company, 2600 Enterprises, were defendants to 
copyright, trademark dilution and infringement, and unfair competi-
tion accusations by Ford Motor Company.  Corley’s company regis-
tered the domain name www.fuckgeneralmotors.com which redi-
rected visitors to the official website of Ford Motor Company located 
at www.ford.com.  Ford argued that this unauthorized linking dispa-
raged the company’s brand name, confused potential customers, and 
prevented it from fully exploiting the value of its mark.  The court 
denied Ford’s request for an injunction, finding that linking alone is 
not sufficient to sustain a commercial dilution claim and holding that 
an infringement claim cannot simply be based on the fact that an In-
ternet user might face difficulty in finding the correct homepage.150 
 
147 See generally Jennifer Golinveaux, What’s in a Domain Name:  Is “Cybersquatting” Trademark 
Dilution?, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 641 (1999) (reviewing the application of trademark infringe-
ment and dilution theories to “cybersquatting,” or registering a trademarked name as a 
domain name before the owner of the trademark).   
Domain names are labels used to uniquely identify the numerical addresses which 
are associated with computers connected to the Internet.  Domain names consist 
of words or recognizable combinations of characters, and offer an alternative way 
of identifying these long and difficult-to-remember numerical addresses.  Domain 
names usually end with an extension such as “.com”, and often provide an indica-
tion of who owns or is using the domain name, for example, “nike.com.” 
  Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames, and Meta-Tags:  An  Intellectual 
Property Analysis, 38 IDEA 243, 244 n.2 (1998). 
148 See generally Kuester & Nieves, supra note 147, at 247 (describing meta-tags as “text coding 
which is hidden from normal view and located within a specially designated portion of 
the HTML code which generates the Web page.  Web page designers use this hidden 
HTML code to designate keywords which are communicated to search engine software.  
This is an important associational tool for the Web page designer since search engines 
are often unable to properly index a particular Web page based on the text of the page.  
In its cooperation with a search engine, a meta-tag keyword may be thought of as a ‘pre-
hyperlink’ since a hyperlink is often created by a search engine in a search results phase 
when a user performs a search using that keyword”). 
149 Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enters., 177 F. Supp. 2d 661, 665 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“If the 
FTDA’s ‘commercial use’ requirement is to have any meaning, it cannot be interpreted so 
broadly as to include any use that might disparage or otherwise commercially harm the 
mark owner.”); see also Voice-Tel Enters., Inc. v. Joba, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1363 
(N.D. Ga. 2003) (stating that extending a dilution claim to the use of a hyperlink would 
exceed the purpose of the Lanham Act’s antidilution provision). 
150 In excellent language, the court held that Ford did not have a cause of action for its vari-
ous claims of trademark dilution, trademark infringement, and unfair competition.  The 
court stated that Congress did not intend the Federal Trademark Dilution Act to  
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Notably, while the briefs of both sides discussed whether an in-
junction on linking based on trademark violations would impinge on 
Corley’s First Amendment rights, the court did not reach the consti-
tutional claim, finding instead that Ford did not bring an adequate 
trademark claim.  Despite this, the Ford Motor case is notable because 
it places important limits on trademark law.  First, it protects the 
practice of hyperlinking without authorization by the owner of the 
destination site and, in doing so, limits the scope of the federal dilu-
tion claim.  If every unauthorized hyperlink were subject to a dilution 
claim, the Internet would be a very different place.  Linking would 
quickly become a practice only feasible for those individuals and 
companies able to pay the costs associated with obtaining authoriza-
tion from website owners.  This concern was echoed in ACLU of Geor-
gia v. Miller, in which a federal court in Georgia overturned a statute 
that criminalized the use of trademarks in a manner that “falsely 
impl[ied] that permission . . . ha[d] been obtained.”151  The court 
held that the Georgia statute violated the First Amendment because 
of the implication such a law had on unauthorized hyperlinking.  The 
statute stated that 
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . knowingly to transmit any data 
through a computer network . . . if such data uses any . . . trade name, 
registered trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or copyrighted sym-
bol . . . which would falsely state or imply that such person . . . has per-
mission or is legally authorized to use [it] for such purpose when such 
permission or authorization has not been obtained . . . .152 
The court found that the regulation threatened the use and prolife-
ration of hyperlinks, central to communication on the Internet.153  
Accordingly, the court applied heightened scrutiny, demanding that 
the regulation serve a compelling State interest and be narrowly tai-
lored so as to not unnecessarily encumber the use of hyperlinks. 
 
be used by trademark holders as a tool for eliminating Internet links that, in the 
trademark holder’s subjective view, somehow disparage its trademark.  Trademark 
law does not permit Plaintiff to enjoin persons from linking to its homepage simp-
ly because it does not like the domain name or other content of the linking web-
page. 
  Ford Motor, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 664. 
151 ACLU of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction); see GA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-9-93.1 (2007). 
152 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1. 
153 ACLU of Ga., 977 F. Supp. at 1233 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (“The appearance of the seal, al-
though completely innocuous, would definitely ‘imply’ to many users that permission for 
use had been obtained.  Defendants have articulated no compelling state interest that 
would be furthered by restricting the linking function in this way.”). 
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Another reason why the Ford Motor case is important is because it 
limited the scope of the federal infringement claim by finding that 
moderate customer confusion was not enough to sustain injunctive 
relief.  Though the link might have led to customer difficulty in find-
ing the Ford homepage, the court dismissed Ford’s claim.  Similarly, 
in Knight-McConnell v. Cummins, the court held that “[t]he mere ap-
pearance on a website of a hyperlink to another site will not lead a 
web-user to conclude that the owner of the site he is visiting is asso-
ciated with the owner of the linked site.”154  Central to the judge’s de-
cision was the understanding that customer confusion online can be 
easily rectified with a few keystrokes and clicks of the mouse.  Addi-
tionally, both the Ford Motor and Knight-McConnell courts emphasized 
that the links had to compete with the mark owner’s business before 
they would recognize a trademark infringement action, reminding us 
of the important non-commercial role that hyperlinks often play on-
line. 
These recent decisions have, notably, protected the use of hyper-
links.  However, neither of the cases spent considerable time on the 
narrow-tailoring issues that would undoubtedly arise from assessing 
prohibitions on linking under a strict scrutiny standard of review.  A 
regulation that prohibits linking without exception would likely not 
withstand a narrow tailoring assessment because website owners can 
take active steps to prevent linking, or, at the very least, the effective-
ness of linking.  The availability of self-help mechanisms makes pro-
hibitions on linking more constitutionally suspect. 
One step website owners can take is to prohibit search engines 
from indexing their sites.  To do so, owners can implement a Robots 
Exclusion Standard (also known as a robots.txt file).155  This bit of 
code signals to the indexing search engine that the website does not 
want to be indexed and included among the search engine’s results.  
While it is still possible for other websites to link to a site that employs 
a robots.txt file (because the website is still published to the public 
Internet), the robots.txt file reduces public exposure and awareness 
of the site by placing it beyond the reach of search engines. 
 
154 Knight-McConnell v. Cummins, No. 03 Civ. 5035 (NRB), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14746, at 
*7 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2004). 
155 As described by Google on its Webmaster Tools Help page, “[a] robots.txt file restricts 
access to your site by search engine robots that crawl the [W]eb.  These bots are auto-
mated, and before they access pages of a site, they check to see if a robots.txt file exists 
that prevents them from accessing certain pages.”  See Block or Remove Pages Using a Ro-
bots.txt File, GOOGLE WEBMASTER TOOLS HELP (Oct. 9, 2010), http://www.google.com/
support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=156449. 
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Alternatively, if website owners are concerned with deep links, or 
hyperlinks that connect the viewer to a specific page within a website 
instead of the homepage, they might install a paywall, or simple pass-
word protection, to ensure that people cannot access the contents of 
the site without first obtaining permission.  While an entity can still 
link to the site that is behind the paywall, the link does not divulge 
any content.  Websites like the Wall Street Journal employ paywalls, 
preventing people from accessing their content without first register-
ing with the website.  While these solutions do not prevent people 
from linking to sites like the Wall Street Journal, they limit the content 
accessed, which is often a key motivation behind linking lawsuits. 
Requiring websites to undertake these efforts toward self-help be-
fore enjoining the use of hyperlinks recognizes the values embedded 
in the architecture of the Internet.  When someone publishes some-
thing on the Internet, she publishes to a public network, not to a pri-
vate intranet.  Consequently, the argument that simply providing the 
address information or directing people to a publicly available web-
site or Web page somehow violates trademark law seems intuitively 
wrong.  The alternative threatens to allow trademark law to encroach 
on and potentially eliminate an entire medium of communication.  
By virtue of publishing material on the Internet, the author implicitly 
accepts the underlying architecture of the Internet:  link and be 
linked. 
While traditional trademark infringement and dilution claims 
should recognize the dynamics of the digital world, both claims still 
have an important place on the Internet.  Customer confusion is a 
concern in both the analog and digital worlds.  I only suggest that the 
doctrine be developed in a way that recognizes the important role 
hyperlinks serve in furthering First Amendment values.  One area in 
trademark jurisprudence that particularly threatens that balance is 
the initial interest confusion doctrine, an untraditional trademark 
claim that is quickly gaining traction in a number of circuits.  I argue 
that the doctrine should be applied very rarely, if at all, to hyperlinks. 
The initial interest confusion doctrine looks at whether the de-
fendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark was done in a manner calculated 
“to capture initial consumer attention, even though no actual sale is 
finally completed as a result of the confusion.”156 
 
156 Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997); see 
also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 257–58 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(“Confusion, or the likelihood of confusion, not competition, is the real test of trademark 
infringement.” (quoting Cont’l Motors Corp. v. Cont’l Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 861 
(5th Cir. 1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  For the Ninth Circuit’s express 
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This doctrine is troubling because unlike the traditional elements 
of infringement claims, which require customer confusion or likelih-
ood thereof at the point of sale, the initial interest confusion doctrine 
merely requires customer confusion or likelihood thereof pre-sale—at 
the point of “initial interest.”  Professor Jennifer Rothman noted in a 
recent article on the subject that nearly every federal circuit has 
adopted the initial interest confusion doctrine, and trademark cases 
are increasingly being decided on initial interest confusion 
grounds.157  Even more concerning, Rothman finds that only a small 
number of courts have questioned the doctrine, and no court has ex-
plicitly rejected it.158 
In Blockbuster Entertainment Group v. Laylco, Inc., Blockbuster filed a 
complaint alleging that defendants’ use of the name Video Busters 
infringed Blockbuster’s trademarks, and sought to enjoin Video Bus-
ters from using their name to market video products and services 
identical to those marketed by Blockbuster.159 
The court ruled in favor of Blockbuster, stating that the fact 
“[t]hat a customer would recognize that Video Busters is not con-
nected to Blockbuster after entry into a Video Busters store . . . is un-
important.  The critical issue is the degree to which Video Busters 
might attract potential customers based on the similarity to the 
Blockbuster name.”160  The court’s central concern was that a small, 
no-name company might attract customers to its place of business by 
using a name somewhat similar to the name of its more popular 
competitor. 
Hyperlinking cases are often perfect illustrations of the confusion 
that may occur pre-sale.  For example, if Sally enters a trademark, like 
Coca-Cola, into a search engine as her search query, she may initially 
be confused by the results returned by the search engine.  The first 
search result is recent news articles about Coca-Cola.  The second 
search result is the official website for the Coca-Cola Company.  The 
fourth result is a Wikipedia article on Coca-Cola.  The tenth result is a 
link to Coca-Cola’s Facebook page.  The twelfth result is for a cake 
that uses Coca-Cola as an ingredient.161  If this is not confusing 
 
adoption of the language, see Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 
F.3d 1036, 1061–66 (9th Cir. 1999). 
157 Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion:  Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 108–09 (2005). 
158 Id. 
159 Blockbuster Entm’t Grp. v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505, 508 (E.D. Mich. 1994). 
160 Id. at 513. 
161 These results are actual results.  I conducted the search was on August 18, 2010, on 
www.bing.com, using the search term “Coca Cola.” 
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enough, none of the sponsored links located on the right hand side 
of the search results page are for the Coca-Cola Company! 
However, this confusion is quickly fixed.  Sally can simply scan the 
descriptions of the returned results to identify the site that she is 
looking for.  Or, if she is unable to identify the correct site based on 
her scan of the search results and she ends up clicking on the wrong 
link, she can easily press the “back” button on her browser and try 
again.  The effect of initial, pre-sale confusion is considerably less 
harmful in the digital world than it is in the analog world because the 
digital world requires the expenditure of considerably less effort to 
dispel any potential confusion.162 
This argument has been recognized by some courts.  In Chatam In-
ternationall v. Bodum, Inc., a federal district court in Pennsylvania 
found that Web surfers are unlikely to be deterred by a few false 
starts.163  The Chatam case arose out of a dispute involving competing 
claims for the use of the Internet domain name “Chambord.”  The 
animating idea in the Chatam opinion is that, unlike in the analog 
world, where mistakenly showing up at the wrong storefront will likely 
cost time, effort, and money to fix, in the digital world such a mistake 
is fixed nearly instantaneously.164  Furthermore, the potential effects 
of initial confusion on the Internet must also be considered.  One 
federal district court assessing a claim by the Network Network—a 
company which provides consulting and training to help people 
create and manage computer networks—against the Nashville Net-
work—a cable television network that broadcasts country music and 
country lifestyle programs—acknowledged this very point, saying 
“[u]nlikely indeed is the hapless Internet searcher who, unable to 
find information on the schedule of upcoming NASCAR broadcasts 
or ‘Dukes of Hazzard’ reruns, decides to give up and purchase a 
computer network maintenance seminar instead.”165 
The analysis above highlights the importance of assuring that the 
meaning of a law created for the analog world is not lost in its transla-
tion to the digital world.  An analog world doctrine that aims to pro-
tect consumers and protect corporate goodwill must not inadvertent-
 
162 See Rothman, supra note 156 (putting forth a similar argument). 
163 Chatam Int’l v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 549, 559 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“[A] consumer 
attempting to access an upscale liqueur product is unlikely to be dissuaded, or unnerved, 
by the sight of coffee makers and other housewares, having first brought up the coffee 
maker’s screen.”). 
164 Id. (“Internet surfers are inured to the false starts and excursions awaiting them in this 
evolving medium.”). 
165 Network Network v. CBS, Inc., No. CV 98-1349 NM(ANX), 2000 WL 362016, at *9 (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 18, 2000). 
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ly stifle a robust medium of communication.  Application of these 
doctrines to hyperlink use must recognize the quantity and quality of 
the speech threatened.  If trademark laws dangerously limit produc-
tive uses of hyperlinks, then the law must be modified or limited in its 
application.   
B.  E-Trespass166 
The archaic property rights claim of trespass to chattels was origi-
nally crafted to protect “a person’s tangible property from being dis-
posed impaired, or deprived of use by another.”167  Thus, a physical 
impairment resulting to the property as a result of a trespass general-
ly gave rise to a cause of action while harmless interference was ex-
cused.  Parlayed into the online world, this tort has generally been in-
voked to protect the unauthorized access or use of data through Web 
crawling, hacking, and recently, hyperlinking.168  In Ticketmaster Corp. 
v. Tickets.com, Inc., the district court rebuffed the idea of e-trespass 
arising from hyperlinking, stating that “it is hard to see how entering 
a publicly available website could be called trespass.”169 
At issue in the case was that www.tickets.com provided deeplinks 
to pages within the Ticketmaster website, bypassing the homepage 
and thus facilitating more efficient purchase by navigating users of 
www.tickets.com directly to the relevant page on www.ticketmaster.
com.  Ticketmaster brought a charge of trespass because of the Tick-
ets.com practice of deeplinking. 
A doctrine that restricts deeplinking because of trespass concerns 
suffers grave constitutional problems because it is not narrowly tai-
lored.  Condoning trespass claims will limit the legitimate use of link-
ing, and thus such regulation suffers from overbreadth.  Instead, 
courts should, as they have thus far, place the onus on the website 
owner to limit access through a .txt file or through technological bar-
riers such as password protection or forced redirection. 
Under a strict scrutiny standard, regulations must be narrowly tai-
lored.  Because of the availability of self-help via mechanisms such as 
paywalls, the courts should continue to apply a light touch when in-
terpreting the law in this area.  Technological self-help should be an 
 
166 This term was developed by John D. Saba, Jr., in his article Internet Property Rights:  E-
Trespass, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 367 (2002). 
167 Id. at 372 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (1965)). 
168 See, e.g., Michael Dockins, Comment, Internet Links:  The Good, the Bad, the Tortious, and a 
Two-Part Test, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 367, 375 (2005). 
169 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, CV 99-7654 HLH (BQRx), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4553, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2000). 
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important consideration, if not a threshold factor, in determining the 
validity of a trespass claim. 
C.  Copyrights 
Under U.S. copyright law, copyright protection automatically at-
taches to every creative work as soon as the work is created and “fixed 
in any tangible medium of expression.”170  The intentional creation of 
a work substantially similar to a copyrighted piece and the subsequent 
use of that work in a manner that violates the copyright owner’s ex-
clusive rights on reproduction, distribution, adaptation, perfor-
mance, and public display is considered infringement.171 
There are a number of affirmative defenses to copyright in-
fringement.  Certain fair uses of the content—such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research—are all 
protected exceptions to copyright law.172 
The nexus of copyright law and hyperlink law hinges largely on 
whether the link extends beyond fair use.  If so, linking might trigger 
liability for copyright infringement.  In the Ticketmaster case refe-
renced above, in addition to the e-trespass claims, Ticketmaster raised 
a number of copyright claims.173  In one claim, Ticketmaster con-
tended that, although the URLs were strictly functional, “they [we]re 
entitled to copyright protection because there are several ways to 
write the URL, and, thus, original authorship is used.”174  The court 
ruled against Ticketmaster on this claim and held that a URL is simp-
ly an address, “open to the public, like the street address of a build-
ing, which, if known, can enable the user to reach the building.”175  In 
a second copyright claim, Ticketmaster claimed that the deeplink to 
its site caused the unauthorized public display of Ticketmaster event 
pages in violation of Ticketmaster’s exclusive rights of reproduction 
and display.  On this claim, the court held that www.tickets.com con-
nected users directly to the originating Ticketmaster site containing all the 
elements of that particular Web page, including information that 
 
170 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
171 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
172 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
173 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBK, 2003 WL 21406289, at 
*4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003). 
174 Id. at *5. 
175 Id. 
1060 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:4 
 
clearly identified the site as belonging to Ticketmaster, and thus was 
not in violation of any of Ticketmaster’s public display rights.176 
Both of these copyright concerns were quickly dismissed by the 
court without much ink spilled on the nature of hyperlinks and their 
need for heightened protection.  While copyright, like trademark, is a 
recognized exception to traditional First Amendment rights, the Tick-
etmaster court engaged in a measured reading of copyright law to en-
sure the exception did not overtake the rule.  Courts should continue 
to deal with traditional copyright claims in this manner, carefully ba-
lancing legitimate government interests with our constitutional right 
to free speech. 
A developing concern in the area involves hot news appropriation, 
a common law extension of copyright law.  Because of the decreasing 
revenues among traditional news outlets caused by the rise of blogs 
and news aggregators, news outlets are threatening to wield the “hot 
news” appropriation doctrine against aggregators and bloggers that 
link to their websites.  The hot news appropriation doctrine was first 
articulated by the Supreme Court in International News Service v. Asso-
ciated Press.177  The facts of the case were straightforward:  the Asso-
ciated Press (AP) was spending a substantial amount of money re-
porting in Europe during World War I, sending the news back to the 
United States, and distributing the news to its member newspapers on 
the East Coast of the United States for dissemination to the public.  
The International News Service (INS), leveraging the difference in 
time zones, paraphrased the AP stories and sold them under its own 
name to the West Coast where the AP did not have as much of a 
footprint.  The Court held that under federal common law, such hot 
news is protectable under the tort of misappropriation within unfair 
competition law.178 
This ruling marked the creation of an important and amorphous 
addition to traditional copyright law.  The addition effectively allowed 
the copyright of facts in certain circumstances, specifically when 
those facts were obtained by the “sweat of the brow”179 of the individ-
ual or entity.  This labor theory of property runs counter to tradition-
al copyright doctrine, which prevents the copyrighting of facts or laws 
 
176 Id. at *6.  Moreover, the court noted that the link on the Tickets.com website to the Tick-
etmaster event page contained the following notice:  “Buy this ticket from another online 
ticketing company.  Click here to buy tickets.  These tickets are sold by another ticketing 
company.  Although we can’t sell them to you, the link above will take you directly to the 
other company’s [web]site where you can purchase them.”  Id. 
177 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
178 Id. at 245–46; id. at 246–48 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
179  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352 (1991). 
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of nature.  Under traditional copyright doctrine, e=MC2 is not copy-
right-able despite the significant labor Albert Einstein exerted in dis-
covering it.  Justice Brandeis, voicing his displeasure with the result 
reached by the majority in INS, noted in dissent that, “[t]he general 
rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions—knowledge, 
truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary 
communication to others, free as the air to common use.”180  INS be-
came more firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence when the Restate-
ment (Third) of Unfair Competition recommended preservation of the 
hot news doctrine, though limiting its application to instances like 
those of INS that constitute “unusual circumstances” that “present the 
most compelling case for protection against appropriation.”181 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York re-
newed interest in the doctrine in its decision in Barclays Capital, Inc. v. 
Theflyonthewall.com.182  In this case, the court invoked the hot news 
doctrine and its sweat-of-the-brow theory when justifying its decision 
to require the Internet-based financial news site Theflyonthewall.com 
to delay its reporting of the stock recommendations of research ana-
lysts from three prominent Wall Street firms.  The court ordered 
Theflyonthewall.com to wait until 10 AM EST before publishing the 
facts associated with analyst research released before the market 
opens, and for research issued after the opening bell, the site was or-
dered to wait at least two hours after the opening bell. 
The opinion is the first to apply the hot news doctrine to the In-
ternet, though this is not the first time a court came across the issue.  
In 2007, the AP sued All Headline News (AHN) for copying and re-
writing stories by AP reporters, distributing the stories to clients, and 
displaying the stories on the AHN website.183  The U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York granted AHN’s motion to dis-
miss the trademark claim and the claim of unfair competition, but 
declined to dismiss the hot news misappropriation claim.184  The case 
was settled soon after. 
The hot news doctrine is already controversial, and applying it to 
the Internet makes it doubly so.  That is because time in the digital 
world runs on an entirely different continuum than time in the ana-
 
180 Id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
181 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. c (1995). 
182 700 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
183 Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  AHN 
provides news, weather, and other content for websites, wireless applications, digital sig-
nage, interactive applications, and broadcast and print use. 
184 Id. 
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log world; everything ages faster on the Internet.  Thus, applying the 
hot news doctrine on the Internet is like applying an analog under-
standing of time to the digital context—a mapping that endangers 
the free flow of information on the Internet.  News that might remain 
“hot” in the analog world has often already cooled in the digital one. 
With favorable precedent in New York, there is considerable talk 
about bringing similar suits to test the reach of the doctrine.  First in 
line is Rupert Murdoch, founder, chairman, and CEO of News Corp., 
who has intimated that News Corp. will wage a war with aggregators, 
specifically Google News.185  To test the waters, Murdoch recently 
brought suit against Briefing.com, a news aggregator focusing on the 
financial sector, alleging, among other claims, hot news misappropri-
ation.186  The suit has since settled, with Briefing.com admitting to hot 
news appropriation.187 
News aggregators collect and post the headlines and ledes of sto-
ries posted on major news sites and embed the content with links to 
the sites on which the full story can be found.  The claim alleged by 
news content providers like Murdoch is that such an action consti-
tutes unauthorized copying and redistribution of the type of factual 
information that is prohibited by the hot news doctrine.  A similar 
sentiment was expressed by GateHouse Media, a company that filed a 
lawsuit against the New York Times Corporation claiming that Bos-
ton.com, an affiliate of the New York Times Corporation, proffered 
“unauthorized verbatim copies of . . . headlines and the first sen-
tences thereof (the ‘ledes’) as first published by” GateHouse Media’s 
various publications.188  Of particular concern to GateHouse Media 
was the “Your Town” tab on Boston.com that provided an aggrega-
tion of news stories from various local sources, including Wicked Local 
News, Daily News Tribune, and the Newton TAB—all of which are owned 
and operated by GateHouse Media.  Though GateHouse alleged cop-
 
185 See Interview by Marvin Kalb with Rupert Murdoch, Chairman and CEO, News Corp., in 
Washington, D.C. (Apr. 6, 2010), available at http://kalb.gwu.edu/2010/
Rupert_Murdoch/337-THE%20KALB%20REPORT-RUPERT%20MURDOCH.pdf (“And 
we’re going to stop people like Google and Microsoft, or whoever, from taking our stories 
for nothing.”). 
186 Complaint at 2, Dow Jones & Co. v. Briefing.com, Inc., No. 10-cv-03321 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 
2010). 
187 Jonathan Stempel, Dow Jones and Briefing.com Settle “Hot News” Lawsuit, ABC NEWS (Nov. 
15, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=12154885. 
188 Complaint at 2, GateHouse Media v. New York Times Co., No. 1:08-cv-12114 (D. Mass. 
Dec. 22, 2008), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/
files/2008-12-22-Gatehouse%20Media%20Complaint.pdf. 
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yright claims, not hot news misappropriation, the claims are remark-
ably similar. 
The copyright claim in GateHouse’s complaint was that the inclu-
sion of the headline and lede violated copyright.  This seems counte-
rintuitive.  Copying such a small portion of a story is likely fair use.  
Copyright scholar Tim Wu argues that the principal question in fair 
use is whether the excerpt in question is a substitute for the story.189  
The headline and lede cannot be understood to be a substitute for 
the entire story.  These two things merely provide the main idea. 
So what made the GateHouse’s claim non-frivolous?  The claim 
carried weight because of the practicalities of the situation.  The way 
in which we read newspapers is changing.  A number of reports are 
showing that while more and more people, upwards of 57%, are 
going online for their news, fewer people are getting their informa-
tion from newspapers.190  Google News and other aggregators are a 
more likely destinations than a single paper’s website, with 31% 
choosing the aggregator and only 8% picking a news site.191  That 
same report found that 44% of U.S. visitors to Google News do not 
click on any headlines, preferring instead to read the headline, lede, 
and any other snippet provided.192  The study showed that aggregators 
like Google News are a destination for news instead of a starting point, 
thus placing aggregators in direct competition with news content 
producers.  These numbers tell us that what GateHouse and Rupert 
Murdoch are taking issue with is not the unauthorized use of the 
headline and lede of their articles; rather, they are concerned about 
the use of the hyperlink, lede, and the link.  What is it about the use of 
the combination of a headline, lede and a hyperlink that makes both 
GateHouse and Murdoch so angry?  It is because with that trifecta, 
people have everything they need by way of news.  If one of those 
pieces is missing, they might need to still visit a newspaper.  But, with 
all three, we know, at the very least, that 44% of Google News readers 
are set. 
This raises the question—why?  Why is that simple, tantalizing tri-
fecta enough news for a growing number of people on the Web? 
 
189 Saul Hansell, The Associated Press to Set Guidelines for Using Its Articles in Blogs, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 16, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/16/business/media/16ap.html. 
190 Robin Wauters, Report:  44% of Google News Visitors Scan Headlines, Don’t Click Through, 
TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 19, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/01/19/outsell-google-
news/. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
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Notably, it is counterintuitive that an accompanying hyperlink 
would make people less likely to visit the linked website, since the 
hyperlink provides no additional substantive content.  The mere fact 
that it makes people less likely to visit a linked site indicates that the 
link itself has some independent expressive value, as described above.  
What is expressed is credibility.  Were Google News or Boston.com to 
simply list snippets without the link, people might not trust the ag-
gregator as much.  As is the case with Google, the aggregators them-
selves often have little or no independent credibility as news provid-
ers.  Their effectiveness at delivering news is contingent on their 
ability to gain the trust of their prospective readers.  Linking to estab-
lished news organizations provides just that credibility—the ability for 
a reader to independently verify the accuracy of the aggregator if she 
so desires. 
The speed of the Internet, the information overload it facilitates, 
and the development of applications like Twitter all encourage com-
munication in short sound bytes.  In our relationship with news, the 
headline and the lede communicate the main idea, the ten-second 
sound byte we are seeking.  The aggregator collects all of the ten-
second sound bytes in which we might be interested and includes 
links that allow us to learn more about the stories that most intrigue 
us.  Thanks to Twitter, we must now communicate in 140 characters 
or less.  In 140 characters, the headline, the lede, and the link must 
be “all the news that’s fit to print,” because it is all the news that will 
fit.193  Curbing the use of any one element of the trifecta will curb the 
usage of a growing, important medium of communication. 
Aggregators also serve an important purpose for the user—
allowing her to receive and process news in a way that ensures broad 
exposure to information but that also recognizes the time and cogni-
tive capacity constraints that limit her ability to process all of the news 
available on the Internet. 
On the other hand, content providers are concerned that if their 
customers opt to get news from aggregators and no longer visit their 
websites, they will be unable to continue to monetize their content 
production.  This argument is fair and important.  If it is an accurate 
representation of the effect of aggregators, the future of journalism 
depends on a proper solution.  However, even assuming that aggre-
gators irreparably damage the content owner’s business model, the 
question still remains:  are aggregators in fact violating copyright or 
triggering hot news misappropriation?  Are headlines, ledes, and 
 
193 For comparison, this sentence is 139 characters. 
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links protected under some labor theory of property?  Is there a more 
narrowly tailored solution that achieves the goals of content providers 
without making our style and methods of communication online il-
legal? 
The first two questions are beyond the scope of this Article.  The 
answer to the third is yes.  Content providers can protect all of their 
content—headline, lede, and body—by constructing a paywall.  Al-
ternatively, content providers can limit access by including a ro-
bots.txt file on their websites.  If an aggregator cannot scrape content 
because a site is not indexed by a search engine, then linking be-
comes a manual process requiring a human being, decreasing the li-
kelihood of aggregators including such content on their sites. 
Of course, the use of these technological fixes comes with conse-
quences for content providers.  Not being indexed or requiring a 
paywall can damage the visibility of a website and potentially damage 
the ability of a website to make money.  However, this decision is one 
that content providers must make.  Allowing content providers to 
wield a legal claim that effectively shuts down one medium of com-
munication just so that they can maintain existing business models is 
not wise and threatens the meaning and purpose of the law.  Though 
the narrow tailoring requirement may frustrate content providers and 
the alternate solutions may not be as effective, a strict scrutiny stan-
dard is still necessary to protect the Internet as we know it. 
The Ninth Circuit in Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.194 recognized the im-
portance of interpreting laws in the light of the broader public bene-
fit when it held that search engines may use thumbnails of images 
without violating copyright.  The court found the use of thumbnails 
to be transformative because the images were not sold as pictures but 
rather facilitated the identification of the images indexed in the 
search engine.  The court noted the “public benefit of the search en-
gine and the minimal loss of integrity to Kelly’s images.”195  In Kelly, 
the court preserved the function of the search engine in the face of a 
copyright claim that would otherwise have effectively debilitated it. 
Courts considering copyright and hot news misappropriation 
claims against aggregators should consider the Kelly ruling and ratio-
nale as instructive.  Imagine the ramifications of the alternative posi-
tion—a position that decries the communication of the main ideas of 
a copyrighted work and citation to the source all in one breath.  
Would we be prohibited from talking about news articles as well?  Ac-
 
194 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002), withdrawn, re-filed at 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
195 Id. at 942. 
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knowledging the First Amendment value of links and recognizing the 
availability of technological self-help that would prevent, or at least 
limit, linking would seem to imply that prohibiting hyperlinks by ag-
gregators would be very much like using a hatchet when a scalpel is 
needed—and required—under the Constitution. 
D.  Contributory Infringement 
If not directly committing copyright and trademark violations, 
many argue that hyperlinks are at least contributing to these violations 
and consequently should be regulated under a theory of contributory 
infringement.  Derivative liability extends to those who facilitate di-
rect infringement of intellectual property.196  Hyperlinks create rela-
tionships between the website containing the hyperlink and the web-
site being linked.  Determining the exact nature of this relationship 
impacts how a court views linking liability. 
The liability arising from linking to a website containing copy-
right-infringing content is controlled by one case right now, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,197 though there are two ma-
jor cases that set the stage for Grokster:  Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah 
Lighthouse Ministry, Inc.198 and Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley.199  
Unlike in other areas discussed so far, third party liability cases have 
not generated positive law supporting the widespread use of hyper-
links. 
In Intellectual Reserve, the district court in Utah prohibited website 
operators from posting the URLs for three independent websites al-
legedly containing copyrighted material.  Utah Lighthouse Ministry 
was ordered to remove all links to websites that it knew, or had reason 
to know, contained material alleged to infringe copyright.  In making 
its ruling, the court disregarded Utah Lighthouse Ministry’s First 
Amendment defenses, holding that “the First Amendment does not 
give defendants the right to infringe on legally recognized rights un-
der the copyright law.”200 
The notion of third party liability was affirmed on the other side 
of the country in Corley.  In Corley, the Second Circuit granted an in-
junction prohibiting Eric Corley from linking to websites containing 
the disputed DeCSS code.  DeCSS was developed to overcome limita-
 
196 Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). 
197 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
198 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (D. Utah 1999). 
199 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
200 Intellectual Reserve, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 1295. 
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tions in the existing technology that prevented computer users from 
being able to play DVDs on computers using the Linux operating sys-
tem.201 
However, a federal district court in Illinois took a narrower ap-
proach in Comcast of Illinois X, L.L.C. v. Hightech Electronics, Inc. by 
holding that linking itself is not enough to constitute contributory in-
fringement and that such liability requires a more direct tie between 
the defendant and the infringing website, such as receiving compen-
sation in exchange for linking.202 
Notably, neither the Intellectual Reserve nor the Corley court ad-
dressed the bounds of narrow tailoring under which prohibitions on 
linking were found to be constitutional.  The Corley Court at least 
recognized the First Amendment implications of their decision, but 
simply held that the injunction was sufficiently narrowly tailored to 
pass muster under the Constitution. 
In Grokster, the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of the 
narrow tailoring requirement as it relates to contributory copyright 
infringement online, though wholly unrelated to links.  The Court 
held that those who distribute devices that are capable of both lawful 
and unlawful use in a manner that intentionally promotes illegal use, 
“as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to fos-
ter” illegal use, “[are] liable for the resulting acts of infringement by 
third parties.”203  In doing so, the Court narrowed the scope of liabili-
ty for third parties and allowed the Internet to flourish.  Specifically, 
the Court held: 
[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses 
would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability.  Nor would 
ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering customers 
technical support or product updates, support liability in themselves.  
The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable 
expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise legiti-
mate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise.204 
 
201 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 459.  To prevent any potential unauthorized viewing or copying of 
their content, movie studios worked with the computer and electronics industries to de-
velop an encryption standard—Content Scramble System (“CSS”).  Industry-wide, all 
DVDs were encrypted using CSS, and all authorized DVD players possessed the “player 
keys” to decrypt the DVD.  DeCSS is a computer program designed to circumvent CSS. 
202 See Comcast of Ill. X, LLC v. Hightech Elecs., Inc., No. 03 C 3231, 2004 WL 1718522, at *7 
(N.D. Ill. July 29, 2004). 
203 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005) (“We 
hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster in-
fringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”). 
204 Id. at 937. 
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The Court’s decision here is so important because it recognizes 
the First Amendment rights at stake online.  While Grokster does not 
directly address hyperlinks per se, the case places third parties impli-
cated in the online copyright debate in a protected space.  Impor-
tantly, however, the Court’s decision in Grokster is an interpretation of 
a statute, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), not of the 
Constitution.  Thus, while the Court recognizes the importance of 
third party intermediaries to the architecture of the Internet and as a 
result grants them immunity under the statute, it falls short of grant-
ing third parties a constitutional privilege. 
This notion of a constitutional privilege to disseminate informa-
tion was recognized most prominently in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van.205  There the Court showed a deep concern for the positive rights 
embedded in the Constitution.  The Court extended a constitutional 
privilege to newspapers because of their role as an incredibly impor-
tant, unique medium of communication.  In doing so, the Court held 
that the libel law at issue was “constitutionally deficient for failure to 
provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that 
are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”206 
The Sullivan Court compared it to the nearly absolute protection 
accorded public officials in libel suits brought by private citizens.207  
The reason for the official privilege is said to be that the threat of 
lawsuit would otherwise “inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective 
administration of policies of government”208 and “dampen the ardor 
of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the un-
flinching discharge of their duties.”209  The Court argued that 
“[a]nalogous considerations support the privilege for the citizen-
critic of government.  It is as much his duty to criticize as it is the offi-
cial’s duty to administer.”210 
The role of newspapers when Sullivan came down was so critical to 
democracy and the First Amendment that the Court found that the 
Constitution “delimits a State’s power to award damages for libel in 
actions brought by public officials against critics of their official con-
duct.”211  In so finding, the Court instituted its actual malice standard, 
a standard so high that it has since made it nearly impossible for a 
 
205 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
206 Id. at 264. 
207 Id. at 282. 
208 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959). 
209 Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J.)). 
210 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282. 
211 Id. at 283. 
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public figure to bring a claim seeking damages arising out of a defa-
mation claim against a newspaper.  The standard was created to pro-
tect the medium and the purpose of the medium.  A newspaper 
serves its function when it is free to comment and report on issues of 
public interest, including public figures.  To apply a lower standard 
would threaten the newspaper’s ability to serve its purpose. 
The same sentiment should extend to protect new media as they 
emerge.  The Internet is a powerful medium whose power derives 
from the robust use of links.  Without the hyperlink, navigation 
would be nearly impossible, and filtering content would be incredibly 
time-consuming.  It is for this reason that hyperlink users must be 
granted a similar constitutional privilege.  Doing so recognizes that to 
allow a lesser standard to limit the use of links would threaten an im-
portant medium of communication that uniquely supports our free 
speech values. 
Extending such a constitutional privilege does not mean allowing 
linking when it clearly intends to facilitate illegal behavior.  Rather, 
applying the doctrine developed in Sullivan, courts should demand 
an intent-based standard that requires plaintiffs to show that defen-
dants possessed the requisite mens rea to facilitate illegal behavior.  
Such a high standard recognizes the constitutional privilege that runs 
to hyperlinks and to their users. 
So how might we apply such a standard?  At the time this article 
was written, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
division of the Department of Homeland Security was very much in 
the midst of its War on Copyright Infringement.212  One prong of its 
attack was to execute warrants against a number of websites, authoriz-
ing ICE to seize the domain names of the sites.213  The seizures were 
motivated by a concern that the sites were either directly or indirectly 
infringing on copyrights.  The targeted sites made it easier for people 
to access the potentially illegal content. 
Under a Sullivan-type standard, without a clear intent to violate 
copyright law, the sites seized should not be charged with violating 
copyright law.  So in the case of Torrent Finder, one of the domains 
seized in a raid that took place on November 26, 2010, the question 
 
212 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2010 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ENFORCEMENT (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
assets/intellectualproperty/intellectualproperty_strategic_plan.pdf. 
213 See Mike Masnick, Who Needs COICA When Homeland Security Gets to Seize Domain Names?, 
TECHDIRT (Nov. 29, 2010, 6:35 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20101128/
15302012021/who-needs-coica-when-homeland-security-gets-to-seize-domain-
names.shtml. 
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is—did the owners of that site intend to infringe copyright?  Deter-
mining intent is a complex and nuanced enterprise and is beyond the 
scope of this Article.214   
The lower court decision in Corley adopted a Sullivan-style posi-
tion.  In applying the DMCA to links, Judge Kaplan recognized the 
First Amendment concerns arising out of hyperlink regulation and 
thus applied a heightened standard of scrutiny.  To avoid applying 
the DMCA in a manner that would burden substantially more speech 
than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests, 
Judge Kaplan adopted the standards of Sullivan and demanded: 
[C]lear and convincing evidence that those responsible for the link (a) 
know at the relevant time that the offending material is on the linked-to 
site, (b) know that it is circumvention technology that may not lawfully 
be offered, and (c) create or maintain the link for the purpose of disse-
minating that technology.215 
The Second Circuit did not adopt Judge Kaplan’s standard on ap-
peal.216 
In some ways, the statutory language of the DMCA recognizes the 
important role of hyperlinks and grants it a sort of privilege.  Con-
 
214    However, here is one way to think about it:  Torrent-Finder is a website that aggregates 
and displays links to other sites.  It functions as a search engine that searches 152 inde-
pendent torrent sites and trackers from one location.  See TORRENT-FINDER, 
http://torrent-finder.info/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011).  In this sense it is like SideStep or 
Hipmunk—websites that function as metasearch engines—searching and consolidating 
data from a number of individual travel websites.  Thus, the technology that underpins 
both Torrent-Finder and SideStep are, for our purposes, identical.  SideStep is just an il-
lustrative example of how metasearch can be a productive and useful tool.  Thus, with 
SideStep as our exemplar, it becomes clear that the technology underpinning Torrent-
Finder is not inherently illegal, and thus mere use of the technology does not imply in-
tent.  
   However, Torrent-Finder is not out of the woods of copyright liability yet.  Though 
the technology may lend itself to dual uses, the creators of Torrent-Finder might have in-
tended for it to be used for illegal purposes.  Ascribing intent to an entity is a tricky en-
terprise and one that requires very specific showings of proof, as we saw in Sullivan.  
However, the text on the website and the advertising language used by Torrent-Finder 
provide initial guidance.  Torrent-Finder promised that it was a “100% legal website, in 
strict compliance with all local laws and copyright agreements.”  Application and Affidavit 
for Seizure Warrant at 30, In re Torrent-Finder.com, Civ. No. 10-2822M (C.D. Cal. Nov. 
17, 2010), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/67610787/45705510-Operation-in-
Our-Sites-2-0.  However, the site also very prominently displayed the torrent websites from 
which it scraped—PSP Pirates, the Pirate Bay, and Pirateeuropa were among them. 
   A third potential element of intent (and the last for this analysis) is consumer use 
and the owner’s knowledge of that use.  If Torrent-Finder is used solely for furthering il-
legal activity and the owners of the site have knowledge of this and actively continue to 
support that activity, then it can be argued that this supports a finding of intent.      
215 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), 
aff’d sub nom., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
216 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 457 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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gress recognized the potentially stifling effects of such broad statutory 
language and thus created safe-harbor provisions within the statute 
itself.  One safe harbor provision was designed specifically to immun-
ize “service providers” that use “information location tools,” such as 
hyperlinks, from charges of contributory infringement.  The relevant 
language of the statute provides: 
A service provider shall not be liable . . . for infringement of copyright by 
reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online location 
containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using information 
location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hyper-
text link, if the service provider— 
 (1)(A) does not have actual knowledge that the material or activity 
is infringing;  
   (B) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
  circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or  
 (C) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously 
to remove, or disable access to, the material;  
 (2) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the 
right and ability to control such activity; and  
 (3) upon notification of claimed infringement . . . responds expedi-
tiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to 
be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity . . . .217 
This provision specifically invokes the “actual knowledge” standard 
and in doing so creates a very high standard under which to implicate 
linkers in a contributory infringement claim. 
The effect of this provision is, however, largely limited by the de-
finition of “service provider.”  The statute states that “the term ‘ser-
vice provider’ means a provider of online services or network access, 
or the operator of facilities therefor.”218  While the language of the 
definition could theoretically encompass businesses that operate web-
sites or other Internet services or facilities, there has yet to be signifi-
cant discourse on the provision.  The limited instances of judicial in-
terpretation of the statutory language have been favorable.  As one 
court stated, “[a] plain reading of [17 U.S.C. § 512(k)] reveals that 
‘service provider’ is defined so broadly that we have trouble imagin-
ing the existence of an online service that would not fall under the 
definitions.”219 
 
217 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2006). 
218 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2006). 
219 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 658 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (emphasis omit-
ted), aff’d, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).  Courts have held that Amazon, eBay, and Aims-
ter all qualify as “service providers” under this definition.  See In re Aimster Copyright Li-
tig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court ruling that Aimster is a 
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However, the legislative history on the subject is somewhat more 
limiting.  The House Report on the bill includes hyperlinks under its 
definition of information location tools and further states that 
“[i]nformation location tools are essential to the operation of the In-
ternet; without them, users would not be able to find the information 
they need.”220  Unfortunately, the discussion that follows focuses 
largely on directories like Amazon or eBay and search engines like 
Yahoo! or Google as service providers that employ information loca-
tion tools.221  Echoing this sentiment, the stated goal of the provision 
was “to promote the development of information location tools gen-
erally, and Internet directories such as Yahoo!’s in particular.”222 
The continued interpretation of this provision of the DMCA will 
be important in the development of linking law.  While a broad read-
ing is definitely supported by the text of the statute, the legislative 
history is potentially limiting.  And, notably, the Corley court did not 
address information location tools and the safe harbor that extends 
to service providers that employ them. 
Additionally, however, courts should recognize something compa-
rable to the constitutional privilege recognized in Sullivan.  This will 
ensure that the protections afforded hyperlinks are not limited to the 
DMCA but extend across all laws threatening the robust use of hyper-
links. 
E.  Contracts 
The assault on links seemed to reach fever pitch with the news of 
websites that simply included a prohibition on external links in their 
terms of service.  In April 2010, the largest Japanese business newspa-
per, the Nikkei, severely restricted the ability of people to link to its 
 
service provider); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 
2004) (holding that Amazon meets the DMCA definition of service provider); Hendrick-
son v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (acknowledging the broad 
definition of a service provider and stating that eBay “clearly” falls within this definition). 
220 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 58 (1998), available at http://gozips.uakron.edu/
~dratler/2006cyberlaw/materials/sec512leghist.htm. 
221 As noted in a recent district court decision,  
Directories are particularly helpful in conducting effective searches by filtering out 
irrelevant and offensive material.  The Yahoo! Directory, for example, currently 
categorizes over 800,000 online locations and serves as a ‘card catalogue’ to the 
World Wide Web, which over 35,000,000 different users visit each month.  Direc-
tories such as Yahoo!’s usually are created by people visiting sites to categorize 
them.  It is precisely the human judgment and editorial discretion exercised by 
these cataloguers which makes directories valuable.   
  Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
222 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 58. 
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site.223  Specifically, the Nikkei now requires those who wish to link to it 
to first complete a detailed written application providing, among 
other things, reasons for linking to the site.224 
The motivation behind the move was to protect its content, to en-
sure that its paywall would not be breached, and to prevent the link-
ing of its content from “inappropriate” sites.225  The company argued 
that links to individual stories could lead to manipulation and confu-
sion and could ultimately threaten the accuracy of the financial mar-
kets.226  To restrict the use of such a provision would threaten the abil-
ity of websites to craft a terms of service agreement suitable to their 
needs, and thus would infringe on their right to contract. 
Though the argument is compelling, the enforceability of such a 
term seems inherently wrong.  The question remains whether or not 
a contracting out of one’s basic rights, like the right to free speech, is 
enforceable.  On this point, the Supreme Court has held that the 
First Amendment does not trump laws of general applicability.  In 
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,227 two newspapers published the name of a 
source who had provided information on the condition of anonymity.  
The source sued for breach of contract, and the newspapers raised a 
First Amendment defense that enforcing the contract would stifle 
their right to free speech.  The Supreme Court held that “the First 
Amendment does not confer on the press a constitutional right to 
disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under state 
law.”228 
Many scholars have criticized the Cohen decision, arguing that it 
effectively allows parties to “use property and contract [law] to cor-
don off information from public purview without First Amendment 
scrutiny.”229  The ability to contract our rights away seems unsettling, 
even unconscionable, especially when considering how unthinkingly 
many of us click “agree” in response to the terms of service presented 
by many sites. 
The holding in Cohen should be limited to only those circums-
tances where the contract in question is one as significant as whistle-
blowing under the condition of anonymity.  In Cohen, both sides were 
 
223 See Hiroko Tabuchi, Nikkei Restricts Links to Its New Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/09/technology/09paper.html. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
226 Id. 
227 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
228 Id. at 672. 
229 Alan E. Garfield, The Mischief of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 35 GA. L. REV. 1087, 1089 
(2001). 
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for a position that would promote First Amendment values, placing 
the Court in a very difficult position.  Allowing a newspaper to print 
what they wish, on one hand, was central to First Amendment juri-
sprudence; on the other hand, enforcing the contract would encour-
age whistle-blowing and protect an individual’s right to engage in 
anonymous speech.  A situation where the government interests are 
not so compelling on either side might shift the debate. 
Such a reading of Cohen would reconcile well with the develop-
ment of modern contract law.  While there is of course an indepen-
dent public policy rationale for upholding contracts, the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts specifically states that “[a] promise or other term 
of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legis-
lation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforce-
ment is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy 
against the enforcement of such terms.”230  Given that there is no leg-
islation on the subject of contracts, the question is whether the First 
Amendment supports a public policy against the enforcement of such 
terms. 
In the context of linking, there is a compelling First Amendment 
right to link.  A website’s interest in preventing the link can be served 
by other, less Draconian methods.  The Nikkei can put up a paywall or 
install a robots.txt file.  The availability of these options decreases the 
relative importance of the Nikkei’s reliance on a contract to prevent 
linking when weighed against an individual’s First Amendment rights 
to link. 
The Court famously held that “[t]here may be narrower scope for 
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation 
appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitu-
tion, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed 
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth 
[Amendment].”231  This famous footnote from United States v. Carolene 
Products Co. reminds us that the Court is authorized to express heigh-
tened concern when the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights are at 
stake.  The discussion in Part II of the standard applied to content-
neutral regulation speaks directly to the judiciary’s long-held belief 
that First Amendment rights are to be carefully balanced with the le-
gitimate interests of other interests in a way that ultimately promises 
free, unfettered speech. 
 
230 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981). 
231 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
May 2011] PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT 1075 
 
Thus, First Amendment values provide a strong argument in favor 
of finding contracts that prohibit linking unenforceable.  This is be-
cause the public policy costs of enforcement are outweighed by the 
extraordinary public policy benefits of non-enforcement. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
As hyperlinks grow in their role as both a medium and a message 
in our daily lives, granting them certain First Amendment protections 
becomes increasingly important.  Because hyperlinks play a dual role 
as both a medium and a message, hyperlink regulation can theoreti-
cally be subject to content-based and content-neutral regulation.  
This Article argues that any regulation of hyperlinks should be re-
viewed under a strict scrutiny standard that recognizes and balances 
the importance of hyperlinks in preserving First Amendment values 
with legitimate governmental needs.  Though it is beyond the scope 
of this Article, I do not intend that such a standard always prove “fatal 
in fact.”  There are instances when legitimate state interests would 
justify limitations on the use of links.  Preventing the use of links to 
intentionally distribute criminal materials is one such instance. 
The above Part III details how courts might consider thinking 
about allegations of trademark infringement, e-trespass, copyright in-
fringement, contributory infringement, and contract violation as a re-
sult of hyperlink use.  In doing so, the section highlights two impor-
tant points.  First, there are limitations to First Amendment law:  
trademark, copyright, and common law contract and tort claims are 
not ignored in the pursuit of First Amendment values.  However, 
these limitations must exist in a way that recognizes the evolving 
scope of protected First Amendment activity.  First Amendment juri-
sprudence must reflect the changing forms of communication, and 
the authorized curtailments of these rights must be updated accor-
dingly.  Second, while thus far hyperlink cases have generally been 
decided favorably, very few of them address the relationship between 
hyperlinks and the First Amendment. 
There are a number of concerns that arise from the treatment of 
hyperlinks as First Amendment-protected speech.  Foremost among 
these concerns is the implication of such recognition on the behavior 
of search engines.  Search engines provide users with links to websites 
based on the user’s search query.  If search engines can claim First 
Amendment rights over their use of links, then regulating them be-
comes difficult—more specifically, regulating them becomes poten-
tially unconstitutional.  Search engines would be able to filter and 
1076 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:4 
 
prioritize search results under the protection of the First Amend-
ment. 
Some prominent First Amendment scholars, like Larry Tribe,232 
would likely support this state of the world.  After all, they might ar-
gue, if a search engine makes its practices clear to its users, the users 
can decide for themselves if they want to continue using that service 
as their search engine of choice.  If they disagree with or dislike the 
search engine’s filtering, then they could always switch to another 
search engine. 
However, such a world is dependent on the number of search en-
gines on the market, the competitive offerings of those search en-
gines, the ability of new search engines to enter the market, and the 
associated switching costs. 
Imagine a world where there were only three major search en-
gines:  Gaggle, Yamoo, and Bang.  New entrants in this imaginary 
world would find it difficult to gain traction,233 and so Gaggle, Yamoo 
and Bang would function as an effective oligopoly in the search mar-
ket.  Now, imagine that all three of these search engines made lucra-
tive deals with various content providers so that Gaggle prioritized all 
the content created by NBC and the New York Times, Yamoo priori-
tized all content created by Fox and the Washington Post, and Bang 
prioritized all content created by CBS and the Chicago Tribune. 
Such a world might strike some as deeply unsettling.  At the very 
least, however, it would represent a major shift in how the Internet 
works.  It would eliminate the democratizing effects of the Internet.  
The Internet would simply become another medium by which in-
cumbent media giants communicate their messages.  Perhaps the 
most unsettling feature of this idea is its likelihood of becoming reali-
ty.  The recently announced Comcast-NBC merger,234 when unders-
 
232 See Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School, The 
Constitution in Cyberspace:  Law and Liberty Beyond the Electronic Frontier, Keynote 
Address at the First Conference on Computers, Freedom, and Privacy (Mar. 26, 1991), in 
THE HUMANIST, Sept.–Oct. 1991, at 15, available at http://epic.org/
free_speech/tribe.html (arguing that networks and network associations, rather than in-
dividual network users, should be treated as the primary beneficiaries of First Amend-
ment rights). 
233 This idea is not simply imaginary.  See, e.g., Tom Krazit, Bug Testers:  Google Is Clean, Bing Is 
Buggy, CNET NEWS (Sept. 15, 2009, 12:35 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30684_3-
10353495-265.html (reporting on an independent survey of bug testers, which revealed 
that Microsoft’s recently launched search engine was responsible for “more than half the 
total bugs reported” by the survey’s respondents). 
234 See Press Release, Comcast and General Electric, Comcast and GE to Create Leading En-
tertainment Company (Dec. 3, 2009), available at http://www.comcast.com/
About/PressRelease/PressReleaseDetail.ashx?PRID=938. 
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tood in conjunction with the Comcast Corp. v. FCC case recently de-
cided by the D.C. Circuit,235 forecasts the future of prioritized content 
on the Internet. 
The power of the Internet demands that information remain easy 
to access and easy to convey.  It is for this reason that the law must 
provide robust protection for the use of hyperlinks.  However, hyper-
links are more than simply a necessary element of the current ma-
nifestation of the Web.  They are also the mechanism that will allow 
us to realize the Web of tomorrow—the Semantic Web.  The Seman-
tic Web is the next logical step in achieving Tim Berners-Lee’s vision 
of a universal medium for the exchange of data.  It actually links indi-
vidual bits of data, instead of just documents.  Instead of linking one 
Web page to another Web page, the Semantic Web will allow individ-
uals to link one piece of data with another piece of data. 
Berners-Lee’s World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) has taken the 
lead in developing the standards and articulating the vision of the 
Semantic Web.  They describe it by painting the following picture: 
There is lots of data we all use every day, and it is not part of the web.  I 
can see my bank statements on the web, and my photographs, and I can 
see my appointments in a calendar.  But can I see my photos in a calen-
dar to see what I was doing when I took them?  Can I see bank statement 
lines in a calendar? 
Why not?  Because we don’t have a web of data.  Because data is con-
trolled by applications, and each application keeps it to itself.236 
The goal of the Semantic Web that Berners-Lee describes is to “al-
low[] a person, or a machine, to start off in one database, and then 
move through an unending set of databases which are connected not 
by wires but by being about the same thing.”237  Whereas the current 
Web uses hyperlinks to create a Web of documents, the Semantic 
Web would weave together data in a way that shows the relationships 
between the linked data. 
Of course, no one knows how we will ultimately engage with the 
Web years from now.  The Semantic Web might very well be the Web 
of the near future, unless some other new, better idea takes its place.  
But, until we know, the humility that animated the technical deci-
sions made by the founders of the Internet should similarly guide the 
 
235 See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (prohibiting the FCC from 
regulating Comcast’s practice of prioritizing content). 
236 W3C Semantic Web Activity, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/ 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
237 Id. 
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decisions of those now responsible for maintaining it—our lawmak-
ers—be they judicial or legislative. 
